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Abstract
Consider a community that shares a technology for producing a club good
(Buchanan, 1965): any group of agents can “win” for an associated monetary cost.
Who should win, and how should production be funded? To address this question,
we seek rules (that is, direct mechanisms) where each agent participates voluntar-
ily and is incentivized to report his valuation honestly, and where these reports are
used to select winners efficiently without running a deficit.
We find that whether or not there are such rules depends on the production
technology. If costs are even “somewhat concave,” then there are no such rules:
the free-rider problem (Wicksell, 1896; Samuelson, 1954; Green and Laffont, 1979)
persists even when agents who do not contribute can be excluded. If costs are
symmetric and convex, however, then there are such rules that moreover satisfy
no-envy-in-trades (Kolm, 1971; Schmeidler and Vind, 1972). We characterize this
class, whose Pareto-worst member is the familiar minimum-price Walrasian rule
(Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973; Demange, 1982; Leonard, 1983); the
other rules do better by treating the agents as equal shareholders in the technology
and offering social dividends (Lange, 1936).
1 Introduction
1.1 Executive summary
According to one version of the free-rider problem (Wicksell, 1896; Samuelson, 1954;
Green and Laffont, 1979), a community seeking to efficiently provide a public good on
the basis of reported interest, with production funded by voluntary contributions, is
doomed to fail. In the usual story, an agent inevitably under-reports his interest and
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underpays, only to later reap benefit from whatever is produced, thereby free-riding on
the contributions of his peers. But might such a person confess his true valuation upon
learning that, should he inadequately contribute, he can and will be excluded from the
final product?
In this article, we consider the problem of providing a club good (Buchanan, 1965):
a good that is (i) nonrival, like a public good, in that no agent’s consumption impacts
another’s (positively or negatively), and (ii) excludable, like a private good, in that any
agent can be prevented from consuming it. Examples include gated parks, high-speed
internet cables, libraries with membership, city sewage, and the like. We find that the
ability to exclude non-contributors helps to resolve the free-rider problem sometimes,
but not always. In particular, when costs are even “somewhat” concave, the problem
unfortunately persists. On the other hand, when costs are symmetric and convex, we
identify a rich new family of mechanisms that improve on the familiar minimum price
Walrasian rule (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973; Demange, 1982; Leonard,
1983) by treating members of the community as shareholders in the production process.
In our model, any group of winners can be provided the club good for an associated
monetary cost, but each agent’s valuation of winning is private information. Because
efficient provision requires the agents’ collective information, we investigate designing an
institution called a game form, or mechanism, which specifies an unambiguous procedure
by which the agents make choices to ultimately determine their outcome. So that these
choices plausibly lead to desired outcomes, we require that no matter the agents’ true
preferences, a desired outcome is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
By the revelation principle (Hurwicz, 1972; Gibbard, 1973), it is without loss of gener-
ality to restrict attention to direct mechanisms, or rules, where the agents simultaneously
report their valuations, then these reports determine who wins and how production is
funded. Our objective is to identify rules that satisfy the following requirements:
• no-deficit: production is funded entirely by the contributions of the agents,
• production efficiency: the winning group is compatible with Pareto-efficiency (though
money may be burned),1
• voluntarism: no agent prefers losing without a transfer to his assignment, and
• strategy-proofness: honesty is a dominant strategy for each agent.
Whether or not these objectives are compatible depends on the production technology,
which follows from the literature:
1. When serving nobody is free, serving everybody has some finite positive cost, and
serving any other group has infinite cost, we are essentially providing a pure public
good, where the Groves rules (Groves, 1973) are the only ones satisfying production
efficiency and strategy-proofness (Green and Laffont, 1977; Holmstro¨m, 1979), and
the voluntary ones necessarily run a deficit (Green and Laffont, 1979).
2. When serving up to k winners is free, while serving more winners has infinite cost,
we are essentially distributing k identical indivisible objects, where it is well-known
that the Vickrey rule (Vickrey, 1961) satisfies our criteria.
1This requirement is sometimes called allocative efficiency, decision efficiency, or partial efficiency.
Because agents have quasi-linear preferences in our setting, this axiom is equivalent to the requirement
that the group of winners is selected to maximize Marshallian surplus.
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Figure 1: An example of a social-dividend schedule, α0. Here, µ1 is the marginal cost
of producing the first object, while µn is the marginal cost of producing the nth. The
schedule is a Lipschitz-continuous function over this interval such that the slope between
any two points on the curve is between 0 and 1. Each agent faces a price in this interval,
which is determined by a particular function that anonymously processes the bids of his
peers. The point on the curve associated with this price is his social-dividend award, and
strategically, the agent can choose whether to lose with the award or win with the award
minus the price.
Our contribution is to extend both of these observations to our general club good model.
Theorem 1 is our strong statement of the free-rider problem: if no agents can be
served for free, and if there are weak returns to scale in the sense that some group’s
cost is less than the sum of costs for its members individually, then no rule satisfies
our requirements. Unfortunately, this applies to all subadditive cost functions, which
are the production technologies that lead naturally to monopoly (Baumol, 1977). This is
disappointing, because we might have hoped that mechanisms could help improve market
outcomes in these industries.
On the other hand, if costs are finite, symmetric, and convex, then there are rules that
not only meet our criteria, but moreover satisfy no-envy-in-trades (Kolm, 1971; Schmei-
dler and Vind, 1972), the equal-opportunity requirement that no agent prefers another’s
net change in resources to his own. Theorem 2 characterizes the rich class of rules sat-
isfying production efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy-in-trades, whose rules each
use the same price function to offer a price to each agent by processing the bids of his
peers anonymously. Each rule additionally has its own social-dividend schedule, which
offers each agent a social-dividend award determined solely by his price. Strategically,
each agent either (i) loses with this award, which is the outcome when he bids less than
his price, or (ii) wins for this award minus his price, which is the outcome when he bids
more than his price. Moreover, the social-dividend schedule is a nondecreasing Lipschitz-
continuous function of price, and the slope between any two points on its curve is at
most 1 (see Figure 1). We refer to rules in this class as citizen-shareholder rules.
Theorem 3 characterizes the citizen-shareholder rules that satisfy no-deficit, which
we call cost-constrained citizen-shareholder rules, using a finite list of constraints on the
social-dividend schedule. Theorem 4 identifies the rules that are Pareto-undominated in
this class, as well as the rules that are Pareto-undominated in its voluntary subclass.
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1.2 Example: The Big Show
When costs are finite, symmetric, and convex, there is in general a large class of Pareto-
undominated rules in our class, but in the special case that there are three agents, there
is an essentially-unique Pareto-dominant rule. We illustrate this rule with an example.
Three fans want to go to some event, which we call the Big Show, but are disappointed
to learn that it is already sold out. Undeterred, they go online to search for tickets that
are being re-sold, and sure enough they find a website where there are three scalpers,
each selling one ticket. Each of the fans is willing to pay $30, while the scalpers’ prices
are $10, $20, and $80.
This is an economy with indivisible objects and money, where each agent wants at
most one object, and where each agent is endowed with at most one object, as in the classic
horse market economy (Bo¨hm-Bawerk, 1888; Shapley and Shubik, 1972); we describe our
contribution to this literature in the conclusion. Here, we simply consider what happens in
our Big Show economy, focusing specifically on the outcomes of the fans. Their outcomes,
of course, depend on the institutional arrangements that prevail in society, of which we
consider four possibilities:
• Jungle:2 First, suppose that each ticket can be acquired with the click of a button
at the scalper’s listed price (as in eBay’s Buy It Now prices), and the fans race one
another to acquire tickets.
Outcome: The fastest-clicker receives a ticket and pays $10, the second-fastest-
clicker receives a ticket and pays $20, and the slowest-clicker stays home and receives
no transfer.
• Walrasian market (Walras, 1896): Suppose now that the scalper’s listed
prices are reservation prices, which we might indeed see if the scalpers are trying
to maximize revenue (Myerson, 1981). The fans go on to offer competing bids on
each ticket. At Walrasian equilibrium, there is a Walrasian price at which supply
equals demand, which must be $30: at a lower price, three fans demand while fewer
scalpers supply; at a higher price, no fans demand while some scalper supplies.
Outcome: Two fans receive a ticket and pay $30, while the third fan stays home
and receives no transfer.
• Monopoly: Suppose now that some outside party acquires ownership of the web-
site, so that the three fans cannot directly access the scalpers, but must go through
the owner. The owner views his website as a technology for producing tickets (by
paying the scalpers as needed). Moreover, the owner has a monopoly on tickets,
and wishes to sell to the three fans in order to maximize profit. Whether or not
the owner is able to price-discriminate, two fans pay their full valuations while no
ticket is sold to the third fan.
Outcome: Same as for the Walrasian market.
• Our rule: Finally, suppose that the three fans seek the help of a mediator. The
mediator does not know their valuations, so he commits to using our rule and asks
each fan how much he is willing to pay. It is a dominant strategy for each to report
2For lack of a better term, we borrow jungle from Piccione and Rubinstein (2007), though our notion
differs from theirs in that we do not consider a stronger fan appropriating money from a weaker fan.
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Figure 2: Logical relations between standard domains of cost functions. Theorem 1
states that there is no rule satisfying our requirements when the cost function is in the
shaded region.
the truth, and in order to form our prediction we assume that the truth is indeed
reported.
Outcome: Two fans receive a ticket and pay $20, while the third fan stays home
and receives $10 as consolation.
It is straightforward to verify that each fan prefers our rule’s outcome to both the
Walrasian market outcome and the monopoly outcome. With respect to the jungle, our
rule transfers $10 from the fastest-clicker to the slowest-clicker, removing envy derived
from clicking speed. Whether or not one prefers the jungle to our rule may depend on
one’s own clicking speed, or whether or not one views clicking speed as a virtue that
should help determine where our institutions direct resources; we simply remark that
this trait is not related to valuation or contribution.
When the scalpers are considered, our rule does not offer a Pareto-improvement over
the Walrasian outcome, but rather a transfer from the scalpers to the fans. That said, it
is easy to see that our analysis is legitimate if the scalpers are replaced by a technology
for producing tickets, and here our rule indeed offers a Pareto-improvement over the
Walrasian outcome.
For this example, our rule does not burn money: the two fans who go to the show
together spend $40, of which $10 goes to the first scalper, $20 goes to the second scalper,
and $10 goes to the third fan. That said, our rule sometimes burns money upon receiving
reports in order to remain compatible with incentives.
1.3 Related literature
Our model is a special case of the Green and Laffont (1979) model: the public decisions
are specifically groups of winners, and preferences are restricted to reflect this additional
structure. This preference restriction does not obstruct us from a fundamental result
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(Holmstro¨m, 1979) that the rules satisfying production efficiency and strategy-proofness
are precisely the Groves rules (Groves, 1973).3
In turn, special cases of our model, given by particular classes of cost functions, have
been previously studied (see Figure 2). In addition to the well-studied cases described
earlier, there is axiomatic analysis for:
• the “almost-public” good class, where all nonempty groups share a fixed finite cost
(Deb and Razzolini, 1999a; Deb and Razzolini, 1999b; Ohseto, 2000; Ohseto, 2005;
Yu, 2007; Ohseto, 2009; Masso´, Nicolo`, Sen, Sharma, and U¨lku¨, 2015; Hashimoto
and Saitoh, 2016),
• the monotone and concave class (Moulin and Shenker, 2001; Mutuswami, 2004),
and
• the general case (Juarez, 2013; Juarez, working); these papers consider group strategy-
proofness.
With the exception of Moulin and Shenker (2001), however, these articles do not con-
sider production efficiency; they usually instead consider budget balance, the requirement
that there is no deficit and no money is burned. Together, production efficiency and
budget balance are equivalent to Pareto-efficiency, and we cannot have both: Groves rules
necessarily burn money to provide incentives (Green and Laffont, 1979).
For monotone and concave cost functions, Moulin and Shenker (2001) characterize the
class of rules that satisfy production efficiency, voluntarism, strategy-proofness, and the
additional requirement that no agent receives a positive transfer, which is fittingly called
no positive transfers. An immediate corollary is that no such rule satisfies no-deficit; thus
for these cost functions, our objectives are incompatible with no positive transfers. While
we do not view no positive transfers as a normatively appealing objective, because it is a
sort of welfare upper bound, this axiom can alternatively be interpreted as the physical
restriction that no agent can transfer the divisible good to another. This could be the
case, for example, if the divisible good is leisure instead of money.
Among our citizen-shareholder rules, the zero-dividend rule is the only rule that satis-
fies voluntarism and no positive transfers, and this rule moreover satisfies no deficit. This
particular rule is in fact none other than the latest incarnation of an idea, known now by
many names, that regularly emerges in these kinds of models. With public goods, it is
called Clarke’s pivot rule (Clarke, 1971; Green and Laffont, 1979; Moulin, 1986; Moulin
and Shenker, 2001). When there is a social endowment of identical indivisible objects of
which each agent desires at most one, it is called Vickrey’s rule (Vickrey, 1961; Ohseto,
2006; Chew and Serizawa, 2007; Saitoh and Serizawa, 2008; Sakai, 2008; Ashlagi and
Serizawa, 2012). More generally, this is the minimum-price Walrasian rule.4 Perhaps
3Technically, the theorem of Holmstro¨m (1979) does not directly apply because it considers maxi-
mizing the sum of valuations, while we take into account the cost function as in Roberts (1979) and
maximize the Marshallian surplus. That said, this is only a superficial difference: the original proof goes
through with this small modification line-by-line.
4When there are (possibly distinct) indivisible objects of which each agent desires at most one and
preferences are quasi-linear, the Walrasian price vectors form a bounded lattice (Shapley and Shubik,
1972), and the minimum-price Walrasian rule, which assigns an outcome associated with the minimum
Walrasian price vector, is strategy-proof (Demange, 1982; Leonard, 1983). These facts persist when
preferences are not quasi-linear (Demange and Gale, 1985), and this rule was recently characterized
(Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015). In fact, even when agents may consume several objects, Walrasian
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surprisingly, the zero-dividend rule is distinguished in another way among the citizen-
shareholder rules satisfying no-deficit and voluntarism: it is the Pareto-worst! Thus for
this class, the content of no positive transfers is anti-efficiency. The welfare improvements
offered by positive transfers have not gone unnoticed; for example, Guo, Markakis, Apt,
and Conitzer (2013) study the Pareto-undominated Groves rules in the general Green
and Laffont (1979) model.
Groves rules have not only been investigated on the basis of efficiency; fairness has
been focal as well. The article contributes to the large literature on fair Groves rules for
economies with indivisible objects and money, where:
• no-envy (Tinbergen, 1946; Foley, 1967) has been investigated (Pa´pai, 2003; Ohseto,
2006; Yengin, 2012b; Yengin, 2016),
• population monotonicity (Thomson, 1983) has been investigated (Yengin, 2013a),
• egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978) has been investigated (Ohseto,
2004; Yengin, 2012a; Yengin, 2012b; Yengin, 2016),
• the identical-preferences-lower-bound (Steinhaus, 1948) has been investigated (Yen-
gin, 2013b), and
• a parametric notion of maximizing the welfare of the worst-off agent (Rawls, 1971;
Porter, Shoham, and Tennenholtz, 2004) has been investigated (Atlamaz and Yen-
gin, 2008).
We consider no-envy-in-trades (Schmeidler and Vind, 1972), which mathematically plays
the same role as no-envy in the above works; we make the distinction to emphasize a
conceptual point.5 Our contribution to this literature is allowing production. Of these
works, the most closely related is Ohseto (2006), which characterizes the strategy-proof
and envy-free rules when there is a fixed supply of identical indivisible objects that all
must be consumed. In this setting, no-envy implies Pareto-efficiency (Svensson, 1983), so
mathematically both proofs involve the same axioms. In fact, one of the cases in our proof
of the Consolation Lemma, which is used to prove Theorem 2, uses an adaptation of an
argument from Ohseto (2006) (though the other case in our proof uses a novel argument).
That said, we do not directly generalize Ohseto (2006), because we cannot simply add
the restriction that all objects must be consumed as an axiom; the restriction also has
implications for what is feasible, and therefore for whether or not a given allocation is
Pareto-dominated.
Our work is related in spirit to early contributions to the free-rider problem, which
often considered a single divisible public good. One of the focal rules in this setting is
prices form a lattice under reasonable assumptions: Gul and Stacchetti (1999) show that Walrasian
prices (for objects, not bundles) form a lattice if each agent’s preferences satisfy single improvement,
which for monotonic preferences is equivalent to the gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford
(1982).
5In particular, no-envy requires that no agent prefers what another agent consumes to what he
himself does, while no-envy-in-trades requires that no agent prefers another’s net change in resources to
his own. Both axioms play the same role mathematically because (i) we suppress private endowments in
our notation, and (ii) the axioms are equivalent when all agents happen to have the same endowment.
Conceptually, we allow envy due to the suppressed endowments, but forbid envy due to opportunities
afforded by the mechanism. In our model, when production is unavailable, a pure redistribution of money
could be necessary under no-envy, but violates no-envy-in-trades; in this way our fairness axiom takes
property rights into account.
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the Lindahl rule (Lindahl, 1919), where one’s contribution is based on marginal benefit,
and before mechanism design was formalized, Samuelson (1954) argued that this rule is
manipulable. In one of the seminal contributions to mechanism design, Hurwicz (1972)
showed that such manipulability is not only a problem for public goods,6 and an analogous
result for public goods (applying to all rules, not just the Lindahl rule) was proved shortly
thereafter (Ledyard and Roberts, 1975; Groves and Ledyard, 1987).
Finally, we mention that in production economies with private goods, there are effi-
cient and strategy-proof rules only in the extraordinary circumstance that production is
linear, where each agent can operate the technology on his own without impacting his
peers (Maniquet and Sprumont, 1999; Leroux, 2004). One might worry that the anal-
ogous result holds for club goods: there are rules satisfying our axioms only when the
cost function is additive. Fortunately, however, the situation is not quite so bleak in our
model.
In Section 2, we introduce the general model, the axioms, and the two special cases
we study. In Section 3, we consider “somewhat concave” cost functions, and describe and
discuss Theorem 1, our impossibility result. In Section 4, we consider the production of
identical indivisible objects, where we describe and discuss a series of results culminating
in Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and Theorem 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 General setting
We consider a community of agents N ≡ {1, 2, ..., n} who share a production technology.
Initially there is only one good, money, which is infinitely-divisible and homogeneous,
and which may be transferred among agents; as the initial distribution of money has no
impact on our analysis, we speak of agents consuming monetary transfers in order to
simplify notation.7 The technology takes money as its input in order to create a group
of winners, whose number we often denote by w. We call an agent who does not win a
loser.
Each agent i is selfish, caring only about his personal consumption of money and
whether or not he wins.8 More precisely, i has a preference relation Ri over R × {0, 1},
where the first coordinate specifies his monetary transfer and the second coordinate in-
dicates whether or not he wins, with 1 representing that he does. Moreover, we assume
that Ri is strictly monotonic in money, quasi-linear in money, and that it satisfies the
6In particular, Hurwicz (1972) considered a two-agent economy with two private goods (that is,
an Edgeworth box economy), and proved that every voluntary and efficient rule is manipulable. This
disappointing result was generalized to the case where there are n agents and m goods (Serizawa, 2002),
and in fact, the situation is even worse than that: no efficient and strategy-proof rule can guarantee that
every agent receives an assignment that is bounded away from the origin (Serizawa and Weymark, 2003).
7Our analysis does not depend on the initial distribution of money for two reasons: (1) our assumptions
imply that each agent’s willingness to pay for an object is independent of his endowment, and (2) none
of our axioms make reference to endowment. In fact, our approach implicitly assumes that addressing
inequality is not a primary objective, since both property rights and fairness—as expressed by our
axioms—are violated whenever money is redistributed and nothing is produced.
8The selfishness assumption restrict the possible interpretations of the club good—for example, it is
not a telephone network (which is more valuable as more friends consume it) or a road (which is less
valuable as traffic grows heavier). Notably, Velez (2016) recently considered a more general preference
domain where agents may have other-regarding preferences.
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possibility-of-compensation assumption: there is an amount of money vi such that there
is indifference between (vi, 0) and (0, 1). These assumptions together imply there is a
unique valuation vi ∈ R such that for each pair (ti, xi), (t′i, x′i) ∈ R× {0, 1},
(ti, xi) Ri (t
′
i, x
′
i) if and only if vixi + ti ≥ vix′i + t′i.
Abusing notation, we identify each agent’s preference relation by its valuation vi. We use
Vi ⊆ R to denote the class of admissible preference relations for i, and we use V ≡ ×Vi
to denote the class of admissible preference profiles. In both special settings we consider,
agents share a common class of admissible preference profiles (that is, for each pair
i, j ∈ N , Vi = Vj); our notation simply allows us to improve clarity.
The agents wish to select an allocation (t,W ) ∈ RN × 2N , which specifies both a list
of monetary transfers t and a group of winners W . An allocation does not run a deficit
if the winning group is produced using a sufficient amount of money as input. This is
expressed using an exogenous cost function C : 2N → R+ ∪ {∞}, with C(∅) = 0, which
specifies the cost of production for each winning group.
Though an allocation that is favorable to the agents should be selected, preferences are
private information. We consider the direct mechanism approach to this problem: each
agent reports his preferences, then these reports jointly determine the allocation. Be-
cause we are interested in dominant strategy equilibria, focusing on direct mechanisms is
without loss of generality (Hurwicz, 1972; Gibbard, 1973). Our problem is to recommend
a direct mechanism, or a rule:
Definition: A transfer policy is a mapping τ : V → RN . A winner policy is a mapping
ϕ : V → 2N . A rule (τ, ϕ) consists of a transfer policy τ and a winner policy ϕ.
Given a winner policy ϕ and an agent i, we sometimes speak of the associated policy
for determining whether or not i is a winner, using ϕi : V → {0, 1} for the mapping
ϕi(v) ≡
{
1, i ∈ ϕ(v),
0, i 6∈ ϕ(v).
In this article, we seek rules that satisfy desirable properties, or axioms.
2.2 Axioms
An axiom is a mathematical property of a rule that captures some aspect of our intuition.
Each of the axioms we consider in this article is standard in the literature.
Our first axiom is the feasibility requirement that production is funded entirely by
the agents:
No-deficit: For each v ∈ V ,
0 ≥
∑
τi(v) + C(ϕ(v)).
Our second axiom is an efficiency notion which is weaker than Pareto-efficiency as
it allows money to be burned. Informally: for a no-deficit allocation (t,W ), the money
burned m ≥ 0 solves 0 = ∑ ti + C(W ) + m. The requirement is that if (t,W ) is
selected, and before anything is produced m units of money are burned and the no-deficit
constraint is updated, then there should be no allocation (t′,W ′) that is still no-deficit,
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that everybody finds at least as desirable as (t,W ), and that one agent prefers to (t,W ).
This can be seen as an ex-post notion: though certain resources may be destroyed,
thereafter the allocation is Pareto-efficient even if production is reversible.
Because preferences are quasi-linear, the amount of money burned has no impact on
whether or not this axiom is satisfied. Moreover, this notion is equivalent to selecting a
group of winners that maximizes a particular objective function: the aggregate consumer
surplus, or the sum across agents of the difference between willingness-to-pay and payment
(Marshall, 1890), that is attainable if no money is burned. For convenience, we take this
as our definition.
Formally, for each v ∈ V , define the (attainable Marshallian consumer) surplus σv :
2N → R by:
σv(W ) ≡
∑
i∈W
vi − C(W ).
Production efficiency: For each v ∈ V and each W ⊆ N ,
σv(ϕ(v)) ≥ σv(W ).
Our third axiom asserts that a certain notion of property rights should be respected. In
particular, without participating in the community and using the production technology,
an agent could receive zero transfer and lose; the axiom requires that this is not preferred
to what is received through participation. In other words, the rule should not be coercive:
Voluntarism:9 For each i ∈ N and each v ∈ V ,
viϕi(v) + τi(v) ≥ 0.
Each rule takes as input preference reports, but our normative axioms are only com-
pelling when stated in terms of true preferences. Our justification for conflating the
reports with the truth is our fourth axiom, which requires that it is a dominant strategy
for each agent to report his valuation honestly:10
Strategy-proofness: For each i ∈ N , each v ∈ V , and each v′i ∈ Vi,
viϕi(v) + τi(v) ≥ viϕi(v′i, v−i) + τi(v′i, v−i).
Our fifth axiom is the equal-opportunity requirement that no agent prefers another’s
net change in resources to his own (Kolm, 1971; Schmeidler and Vind, 1972):
No-envy-in-trades: For each pair i, j ∈ N and each v ∈ V ,
viϕi(v) + τi(v) ≥ viϕj(v) + τj(v).
9This is sometimes called individual rationality, which is appropriate when agents are in fact free to
not participate.
10This standard justification for assuming honest reporting is unfortunately not well-supported by
experimental evidence (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Attiyeh, Franciosi, and
Isaac, 2000; Kawagoe and Mori, 2001). This has motivated stronger implementation notions, such as
secure implementation (Saijo, Sjo¨stro¨m, and Yamato, 2007) and obvious strategy-proofness (Li, 2016),
which we do not consider here.
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Finally, we consider the standard incomplete ordering of rules in which a first rule
dominates a second if, at each profile, the recommendation of the first Pareto-dominates
the recommendation of the second:
Definition: For each pair of rules (τ ∗, ϕ∗), (τ, ϕ), we say (τ ∗, ϕ∗) weakly Pareto-dominates
(τ, ϕ) if for each i ∈ N and each v ∈ V ,
viϕ
∗
i (v) + τ
∗
i (v) ≥ viϕi(v) + τi(v).
If (τ ∗, ϕ∗) weakly Pareto-dominates (τ, ϕ) but (τ, ϕ) does not weakly Pareto-dominate
(τ ∗, ϕ∗), then we say (τ ∗, ϕ∗) (strictly) Pareto-dominates (τ, ϕ). If (τ ∗, ϕ∗) and (τ, ϕ)
weakly Pareto-dominate each other, then we say they are Pareto-indifferent.
3 The service setting
Our analysis focuses on two special cases of the general model, each of which involves
additional assumptions about the structure of the cost function and the domain of ad-
missible preferences.
In this section, we consider the service setting: no agents can be served for free,
and there are weak returns to scale in the sense that some group’s cost is less than the
sum of costs for its members individually (see Figure 2 in introduction). Beyond these
assumptions, the club good is not required to actually be a service; we simply use service
to concisely contrast this setting from our second setting, and to suggest a few possible
applications (such as a public utility or an exclusive postal service). The incompatibility
of our axioms holds even if it is common knowledge that the service is undesirable, and
strategic agents are unable to report otherwise:
Definition: The service setting entails the following assumptions:
• Positive costs: For each nonempty W ⊆ N , C(W ) > 0.
• Weak returns: There is W ⊆ N such that ∑W C({i}) > C(W ).
• Desirable domain: For each i ∈ N , Vi = R+.
As discussed in the introduction, when serving nobody is free, serving everybody
has some finite positive cost, and serving any other group has infinite cost, no rule
satisfies our axioms (Groves, 1973; Green and Laffont, 1977; Holmstro¨m, 1979; Green
and Laffont, 1979). On the other hand, when costs are positive and concave, our axioms
are incompatible when the divisible resource cannot be transferred from one agent to
another (Moulin and Shenker, 2001).
Unfortunately, we find that these negative results are part of a broader, pervasive
impossibility. The incompatibility of our axioms is not caused by non-excludability of
the indivisible output, nor by non-transferability of the divisible input, and moreover this
incompatibility holds across a large class of cost functions:
Theorem 1: In the service setting, there is no rule satisfying no-deficit, production
efficiency, voluntarism, and strategy-proofness.
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The proof is in Appendix 1. For these cost functions, the free-rider problem cannot
be solved by excluding non-contributors: any direct mechanism is either unaffordable,
inefficient, manipulable, or coercive.
We remark that this impossibility is tight. If any of the four axioms is dropped, there
is a rule that satisfies the other three:
• No-Deficit: For each v ∈ V and each i ∈ N , define σ∗v ≡ maxW⊆N σv(W ) to be the
maximal surplus, and define σ−iv ≡ maxW⊆N\{i} σv(W ) to be the maximal surplus
among groups that do not include i. Let ϕ∗(v) be such that σv(ϕ∗(v)) = σ∗v , and
for each i ∈ N , define τ 1i (v) ≡ −viϕ∗i (v) + (σ∗v − σ−iv ). Then (τ 1, ϕ∗) is (welfare-
equivalent to) the marginal cost pricing mechanism of Moulin and Shenker (2001),
and therefore satisfies production efficiency, voluntarism, and strategy-proofness,
but fails no-deficit.
• Production efficiency: For each v ∈ V and each i ∈ N , define ϕ2(v) ≡ ∅ and
define τ 2(v) ≡ 0. It is easy to see that (τ 2, ϕ2) satisfies no-deficit, voluntarism, and
strategy-proofness, but fails production efficiency.
• Voluntarism: Let τ 4(v) be such that for each i ∈ N , τ 4i (v) = −maxW⊆N C(W ). It
is easy to see that (τ 4, ϕ∗) satisfies no-deficit, production efficiency, and strategy-
proofness, but fails voluntarism.
• Strategy-proofness: For each i ∈ N , define τ 3i (v) ≡ −ϕ∗i (v)vi. It is easy to see that
(τ 3, ϕ∗) satisfies production efficiency and voluntarism, but fails strategy-proofness.
To see that no-deficit is satisfied, assume, by way of contradiction, that there is
v ∈ V such that ∑ τ 3i (v) + C(ϕ∗(v)) > 0. Then 0 > ∑ϕ∗(v) vi − C(ϕ∗(v)), so
σv(∅) > σv(ϕ∗(v)), contradicting that ϕ∗ maximizes surplus at v.
Moreover, if either of the cost function restrictions is dropped, there is a rule satisfying
all four axioms:
• Weak Returns: This is the topic of Section 4.
• Positive Costs: Consider N = {1, 2} and C given by C({1}) = 0, C({2}) = 2 and
C({1, 2}) = 1. Let ϕ(v) = {1, 2} if v2 ≥ 1 and ϕ(v) = {1} otherwise, and let
τ(v) = (0, 1) if 2 ∈ ϕ(v) and τ(v) = (0, 0) otherwise. It is easy to see that (τ, ϕ)
satisfies all four axioms.
4 The object setting
We move onward from the disappointing findings of Section 3, and now turn our attention
to the object setting: costs are finite, the cost of serving a group depends only on its
size (not on the specific identities of its members), and costs are convex. The simplest
interpretation is that we are producing and distributing identical indivisible objects, and
producing additional objects becomes progressively more expensive. The compatibility
of our axioms holds even if any given agent might view the object as either a good or a
bad:
Definition: The object setting entails the following assumptions:
• Finite costs: For each W ⊆ N , C(W ) <∞.
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• Symmetry: For each pair W,W ′ ⊆ N , |W | = |W ′| implies C(W ) = C(W ′).
• Convexity: For each i ∈ N and each pair W,W ′ ⊆ N\{i} such that W ⊆ W ′,
C(W ′ ∪ {i})− C(W ′) ≥ C(W ∪ {i})− C(W ).
• Full domain: For each i ∈ N , Vi = R.
As costs are symmetric, we abuse notation, writing C : {0, 1, 2, ..., n} → R+, where
C(w) denotes the monetary cost of producing w winners. Moreover, as costs are finite
and convex, there are marginal costs µ1, µ2, ..., µn ∈ R+ such that
(i) µn ≥ µn−1 ≥ ... ≥ µ1, and
(ii) for each w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, C(w) = ∑wi=1 µi.
We begin by introducing an index that ranks agents from highest valuation to lowest,
breaking ties using the original index: for each v ∈ V , define A1(v), A2(v), ..., An(v) ∈ N
such that (1) {Ai(v)} = N , and (2) for each pair r, r′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that r′ > r,
either
(i) vAr(v) > vAr′ (v), or
(ii) vAr(v) = vAr′ (v) and Ar′(v) > Ar(v).
We say that r is the rank-index of agent Ar(v) at v. We also introduce an index for
listing the valuations themselves from highest to lowest, thinking of them as “bids” when
ranked: for each v ∈ V and each r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, define Br(v) ≡ vAr(v). We say that r is
the rank-index of valuation Br(v) at v. For emphasis, B1(v) ≥ B2(v) ≥ ... ≥ Bn(v).
Analogous notation is also used for each i ∈ N and each v−i ∈ V−i. Put another way,
N\{i} = {A1(v−i), A2(v−i), ..., An−1(v−i)}, B1(v−i) ≥ B2(v−i) ≥ ... ≥ Bn−1(v−i), and the
re-indexed agents correspond to the re-indexed values at v−i (with ties broken using the
original index as above).
Our first result characterizes the rules satisfying production efficiency, whose defining
feature is that the winners have the high valuations, justifying the term “bid” for prefer-
ence report. More precisely, the winners are the high bidders, provided that each winning
valuation is at least the marginal cost of the final object and each losing valuations does
not exceed the marginal cost of another:
Bidding Lemma: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies production efficiency if and
only if for each v ∈ V with w ≡ |ϕ(v)|,
(i) for each i ∈ ϕ(v) and each j ∈ N\ϕ(v), vi ≥ vj,
(ii) w 6= 0 implies Bw(v) ≥ µw, and
(iii) w 6= n implies µw+1 ≥ Bw+1(v).
The proof is in Appendix 2. By the Bidding Lemma, at each profile v, a rule satis-
fying production efficiency first selects a number of winners w satisfying two constraints,
then selects a group of that size whose valuations are highest. This is suggestive of an
“equilibrium quantity,” though there is no corresponding suggestion of an “equilibrium
price.”
Our second result characterizes the rules satisfying strategy-proofness, whose defining
feature is that each agent’s attainable set is described by a consolation award and a
price. In particular, each agent can either lose for the consolation award or win for the
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consolation award minus the price. Moreover, the agent wins when he bids more than
the price and loses when he bids less:
Price Lemma: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies strategy-proofness if and only
if for each i ∈ N and each v−i ∈ V−i, there are τ+i (v−i), τ−i (v−i) ∈ R and pi(v−i) ∈
R ∪ {−∞,∞} such that for each vi ∈ Vi,
(i) (τi(v), ϕi(v)) is either (τ
+
i (v−i), 1) or (τ
−
i (v−i), 0),
(ii) pi(v−i) 6∈ {−∞,∞} implies τ+i (v−i) = τ−i (v−i)− pi(v−i),
(iii) vi > pi(v−i) implies i ∈ ϕ(v), and
(iv) pi(v−i) > vi implies i 6∈ ϕ(v).
The proof is in Appendix 3. Each agent faces a personalized price determined by the
reports of his peers, though this is not quite enough to suggest an “equilibrium price.”
Our next objective is to characterize the rules satisfying both production efficiency and
strategy-proofness. As the winner policy is fixed, what remains is to describe the transfer
policy. By the Price Lemma, each agent i faces a price pi(v−i) such that he demands
an object with a higher report and demands no object with a lower report. For such a
rule to satisfy production efficiency, these n prices must form an “equilibrium” at which
honest agents independently demand objects in a manner that maximizes surplus. This
dramatically restricts the manner in which an agent’s price can depend on the reports of
his peers.
For each i ∈ N , define the price for i, pi : V−i → [µ1, µn], by:
Ω(v−i) ≡ |
{
r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}|Br(v−i) ≥ µr
}|,
pi(v−i) ≡
{
min{BΩ(v−i)(v−i), µΩ(v−i)+1}, Ω(v−i) > 0,
µ1, Ω(v−i) = 0.
Thus Ω(v−i) is the maximum number of i’s peers that may win, and pi(v−i) is either the
lowest of the bids of these peers or the marginal cost of an additional object—whichever is
lower. Note that pi is not indexed by any agent and that it processes reports anonymously;
each agent’s price is determined by this common function that only depends on the list
of peer bids, but not on which peers submitted which bids.
We use “auction” to refer to a rule in which both (i) winners are high bidders, and
(ii) each agent’s bid is used to determine whether or not he demands an object at a
particular price. The following class of auctions use prices, and are characterized by
production efficiency and strategy-proofness:
Definition: For each i ∈ N , a peer-consolation schedule is a function αi : V−i → R. A
rule (τ, ϕ) is a peer-consolation rule if (I) it satisfies production efficiency, and (II) for
each i ∈ N , there is a peer-consolation schedule αi : V−i → R such that for each v−i ∈ V−i,
(i) (τi(v), ϕi(v)) is either (αi(v−i)− pi(v−i), 1) or (αi(v−i), 0),
(ii) vi > pi(v−i) implies i ∈ ϕ(v), and
(iii) pi(v−i) > vi implies i 6∈ ϕ(v).
Auction Lemma: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies production efficiency and
strategy-proofness if and only if it is a peer-consolation rule.
The proof is in Appendix 4. By a superficial adaptation of Holmstro¨m (1979) (see
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footnote 3), these are precisely the Groves (1973) rules; the additional structure in our
representation is due to the additional structure in our model.
We have thus far emphasized that each agent’s price is determined by the reports of
his peers. But when the entire profile of reports is considered, the prices are collectively
harmonious in a particular way: winners face one price and losers face another. Moreover,
the lowest winning bid is at least the losers’ price, which is at least the winners’ price,
which is at least the highest losing bid. Formally, define:
Ω(v) ≡ |{r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}|Br(v) ≥ µr}|,
pi+(v) ≡

µn, Ω(v) = n,
max{BΩ(v)+1(v), µΩ(v)}, n > Ω(v) > 0
µ1, Ω(v) = 0.
pi−(v) ≡

µn, Ω(v) = n,
min{BΩ(v)(v), µΩ(v)+1}, n > Ω(v) > 0
µ1, Ω(v) = 0.
Winner-Loser Prices Lemma: In the object setting, for each v ∈ V and each i ∈ N ,
(i) vi ≥ pi(v−i) implies pi(v−i) = pi+(v), and
(ii) pi(v−i) ≥ vi implies pi(v−i) = pi−(v).
Moreover, either vi ≥ pi−(v) ≥ pi+(v) or pi−(v) ≥ pi+(v) ≥ vi.
The proof is in Appendix 5.
Which peer-consolation rules satisfy no-envy-in-trades? In order to provide a complete
answer, we first observe that no-envy-in-trades imposes a strong restriction on peer-
consolation schedules: an agent’s consolation award cannot depend on the reports of his
peers in any way, but rather can only depend on a particular summary statistic of their
reports. Moreover, this particular summary statistic is his own price:
Consolation Lemma: In the object setting, if a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies production ef-
ficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy-in-trades, then (τ, ϕ) is a peer-consolation rule
with peer-consolation schedules (αi) such that for each i ∈ N and each pair v−i, v′−i ∈ V−i,
pi(v−i) = pi(v′−i) implies αi(v−i) = αi(v
′
−i).
The proof, which is the central proof of this article, is in Appendix 6.
In fact, no-envy-in-trades further implies that agents share a common peer-consolation
schedule that depends only on price, and moreover that this common schedule is nonde-
creasing, Lipschitz-continuous, and without a slope greater than 1 at any point. We call
a communal peer-consolation schedule with these features a social-dividend schedule:
Definition: A social-dividend schedule is a (Lipschitz-continuous) function α0 : [µ1, µn]→
R such that for each distinct pair pi′, pi ∈ [µ1, µn],
α0(pi
′)− α0(pi)
pi′ − pi ∈ [0, 1].
A rule (τ, ϕ) is citizen-shareholder rule if (I) it satisfies production efficiency, and (II) there
is a social-dividend schedule α0 such that for each i ∈ N and each v−i ∈ V−i,
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(i) (τi(v), ϕi(v)) is either (α0(pi(v−i))− pi(v−i), 1) or (α0(pi(v−i)), 0),
(ii) vi > pi(v−i) implies i ∈ ϕ(v), and
(iii) pi(v−i) > vi implies i 6∈ ϕ(v).
Theorem 2: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies production efficiency, strategy-
proofness, and no-envy-in-trades if and only it is a citizen-shareholder rule.
The proof is in Appendix 7.
Remarkably, each citizen-shareholder rule can be viewed as a kind of equal-income
Walrasian rule. In particular, consider a citizen-shareholder rule with social-dividend
schedule α0, and let v ∈ V . Let w denote the number of winners, and define
Y (v) ≡ α0(pi−(v)),
pWalras+ (v) ≡ pi+(v) + (α0(pi−(v))− α0(pi+(v))), and
pWalras− (v) ≡ 0.
Then the income Y (v) and the price vector (pWalras+ (v), p
Walras
− (v)) together determine
a budget set. By construction, each winner receives Y (v) − pWalras+ (v) and each loser
receives Y (v)− pWalras− (v). If n > w > 0, then there is at least one winner and one loser,
so by no-envy-in-trades, each winner selects his bundle from the budget set and each loser
does as well. If w = n, then each agent wins and receives α0(µn)− µn, which he finds at
least as desirable as losing and receiving α0(µn) as his value is at least µn. If w = 0, then
each agent loses and receives α0(µ1), which he finds at least as desirable as winning and
receiving α0(µ1)− µ1 as his value is at most µ1. Thus in all cases, each agent receives a
bundle he most-prefers from the common budget set.
Unsurprisingly, the price of an object is never negative; in fact it is always at least µ1.
More surprisingly, the income Y (v) can be positive, and in particular the total income
received by the agents may exceed the amount of money initially in the economy. This is
possible when the winners overpay; their overpayments can be used to finance the income
for themselves and for the losers.
We now turn our attention to the constraints imposed by the no-deficit axiom.
Definition: A cost-constrained social-dividend schedule is a social-dividend schedule
such that:
(i) α0(µ1) ≤ 0,
(ii) for each w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1},
(n− w)α0(µw+1) ≤
(
wµw − C(w)
)− wα0(µw), and
(iii) α0(µn) ≤ nµn − C(n)
n
.
A rule (τ, ϕ) is a cost-constrained citizen-shareholder rule if (I) (τ, ϕ) is standard and (II)
there is a cost-constrained social-dividend schedule α0 such that for each i ∈ N and each
v−i ∈ V−i, (τi(v), ϕi(v)) is either (α0(pi(v−i))− pi(v−i), 1) or (α0(pi(v−i)), 0).
Theorem 3: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies no-deficit, production effi-
ciency, strategy-proofness and no-envy-in-trades if and only it is a cost-constrained citizen-
shareholder rule.
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The proof is in Appendix 8.
Finally, we turn our attention to (i) rules that are not Pareto-dominated, and (ii) our
final axiom, voluntarism. First, we define the family of social-dividend schedules which
most-aggressively increase to hit the social-dividend awards at the marginal costs:
Definition: A social-dividend schedule α0 is unrelenting if there is (aw) ∈ RN such that
(i) for each w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, α0(µw) = aw, and
(ii) for each w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} and each δ ∈ [0, µw+1 − µw],
α0(µw + δ) = min{α0(µw) + δ, α0(µw+1)}.
In this case, we say that (aw) is the marginal cost award profile of α0.
As each unrelenting social-dividend schedule can be described by its marginal cost
award profile, so too can the class of citizen-shareholder rules with such schedules that
are not Pareto-dominated be described by its associated class of marginal cost award
profiles. In particular, define the set of marginal cost award profiles A ⊆ RN by:
A ≡ {a ∈ RN |a1 ≤ 0;
for each w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1},
aw+1 − aw ≤ µw+1 − µw,
aw+1 − aw ≥ 0, and
(n− w)aw+1 + waw ≤ wµw − C(w); and
an ≤ nµn − C(n)
n
.}
Define the subset of profiles that (we claim, and will show) are compatible with voluntary
rules AV ⊆ A by:
AV ≡ {a ∈ A|a1 = 0}.
To define the vector domination relation ≥, for each pair a, a′ ∈ RN , define a ≥ a′ if and
only if for each w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, aw ≥ a′w. If a ≥ a′ and a 6= a′, we write a > a′. Define
the respective ‘frontier’ sets F ⊆ A and FV ⊆ AV by:
F ≡ {a ∈ A|a′ ∈ A and a′ ≥ a implies a′ = a}, and
FV ≡ {a ∈ AV |a′ ∈ A and a′ ≥ a implies a′ = a}.
Theorem 4: In the object setting,
(I) a rule (τ, ϕ) (i) satisfies no-deficit, production efficiency, strategy-proofness, and
no-envy-in-trades, and (ii) is not Pareto-dominated by another such rule, if and only if it
is a cost-constrained citizen-shareholder rule with an unrelenting social-dividend schedule
whose marginal cost award profile belongs to F .
(II) a rule (τ, ϕ) (i) satisfies no-deficit, production efficiency, voluntarism, strategy-
proofness, and no-envy-in-trades, and (ii) is not Pareto-dominated by another such rule,
if and only if it is a cost-constrained citizen-shareholder rule with an unrelenting social-
dividend schedule whose marginal cost award profile belongs to FV .
The proof is in Appendix 9.
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5 Conclusion
We conclude by discussing several observations about our results.
5.1 Asymmetric costs
For our positive results, we imposed that the cost function is symmetric, but analogous
results hold if costs are asymmetric in a structured way and no-envy-in-trades is adapted
accordingly. In particular, suppose that—as before—production costs are given by a
symmetric, finite, and convex function C. Now, however, in addition to these production
costs, each agent i ∈ N has a personal cost κi. For example, this might be the cost of
shipping the object to agent i, or it might be the cost of further customizing the object
to his specifications. Altogether, the cost of serving group W is now given by:
Cˆ(W ) = C(W ) +
∑
i∈W
κi.
In this setting, it is straightforward to modify our rules so that each agent necessarily
pays his own personal cost should he win. In particular, for each i ∈ N , define vˆi ≡ vi+κi.
For each rule (τ, ϕ), define the rule (τˆ , ϕˆ) by defining, for each v ∈ V and each i ∈ N ,
ϕˆ(vˆ) ≡ ϕ(v), and
τˆi(vˆ) ≡ τi(v)− ϕi(v)κi.
For brevity, we use the past tense to refer to (τ, ϕ) and the present tense to refer
to (τˆ , ϕˆ). We claim that if (τ, ϕ) satisfied the axioms for C, then (τˆ , ϕˆ) ‘inherits’ these
axioms for Cˆ when no-envy-in-trades is properly adapted. Indeed, for each v ∈ V ,
• since no-deficit was satisfied at v, it is now satisfied at vˆ because each winner now
covers his personal cost,
• since production efficiency was satisfied at v, it is now satisfied at vˆ because each
group has the same Marshallian surplus as before (since valuation increases are
equal to cost increases), and
• since voluntarism was satisfied at v, it is now satisfied at vˆ because a loser receives
the same non-negative transfer, while a winner’s valuation increases by the same
amount as his contribution.
For strategy-proofness, it suffices to observe that for each i ∈ N , each v ∈ V , and each
v′i ∈ Vi,
viϕi(v) + τi(v) = vˆiϕˆi(vˆ) + τˆi(vˆ), and
viϕi(v
′
i, v−i) + τi(v
′
i, v−i) = vˆiϕˆi(vˆi, vˆ−i) + τˆi(vˆi, vˆ−i).
from which the inheritance of strategy-proofness immediately follows.
To adapt no-envy-in-trades, we require that when an agent considers a peer’s as-
signment, he first adjusts it by replacing his peer’s personal cost with his own before
comparing:
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No-envy-in-adjusted-trades: For each pair i, j ∈ N and each v ∈ V ,
viϕi(v) + τi(v) ≥ viϕj(v) + τj(v) + ϕj(v)(κj − κi).
In other words, when i considers the assignment of j, if j wins, then in the adjustment κj
is returned and then κi is deducted. It is straightforward to verify that if (τ, ϕ) satisfies
no-envy-in-trades, then (τˆ , ϕˆ) satisfies no-envy-in-adjusted-trades.
Altogether, then, in this special class of cost functions with asymmetric costs (which
includes all additive cost functions), these natural analogues of our rules satisfy our
requirements when the equal opportunity requirement is adjusted to take into account
differences in personal costs.
5.2 Two-sided economies
Consider an economy with money and indivisible objects, where each agent desires at
most one object and has preferences summarized by his valuation. Moreover, each agent
belongs to one of two sides: each buyer is initially endowed with no object, while each
seller is initially endowed with one object.
In such an economy, there are Walrasian price vectors (Koopmans and Beckmann,
1957; Gale, 1960), which have associated outcomes that form the core of a cooperative
game for that economy (Shapley and Shubik, 1972). Moreover, the set of Walrasian
price vectors is a bounded lattice (Shapley and Shubik, 1972), and when seller valuations
are common knowledge, the minimum-price Walrasian rule, which uses reported buyer
valuations to calculate the minimum Walrasian price vector and assign the associated
core outcome, is strategy-proof (Demange, 1982; Leonard, 1983).11
Our analysis applies to the special case where the objects are identical. Indeed, though
we originally presented µ1, µ2, ..., µn as marginal costs for the production technology, it
would be just as legitimate to interpret these numbers as commonly-known seller valua-
tions. In this special case, there is a single Walrasian price instead of a Walrasian price
vector (Shapley and Shubik, 1972). Note that in this interpretation, a Walrasian outcome
is Pareto-efficient: it does not involve burned money, but rather seller profit, and thus
there is no violation of the First Welfare Theorem.
A rule in our class uses reported buyer valuations to calculate the minimum Walrasian
price, but it does not necessarily recommend the associated core outcome, where each
buyer receives his most-preferred bundle from the budget set given by this price and zero
transfer. Instead, it may recommend an outcome where each buyer receives his most-
preferred bundle from the budget set given by this price and some positive transfer, which
is an outcome outside of the core.
In the cooperative game for our Big Show example, the two fans who go to the show
and the two scalpers who sell them tickets would together block our rule’s recommenda-
tion. Thus it is only if the buyers can commit to honoring our rule’s recommendation and
not cooperating with the sellers that they might benefit, with respect to the Walrasian
core outcome, at the sellers’ expense. Similarly, in the market for horses considered by
Bo¨hm-Bawerk (1888), the horse-less might benefit over the classic solutions through such
11Demange and Gale (1985) showed that these facts persist even when preferences are not quasi-
linear—namely, that Walrasian prices form a lattice, and that the minimum-price Walrasian rule is
strategy-proof—and this rule was recently characterized by Morimoto and Serizawa (2015).
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a pact. Whether such an agreement constitutes cooperation or collusion is a matter of
perspective, varying from one side of the market to the other.
We remark that if, in our Big Show example, the fans are viewed as a nation that
exports money, while the scalpers are viewed as a nation that exports tickets, then we
have a (small) economy of international trade. For such economies, our rules suggest a
role for a government that is dedicated only to the welfare of its own citizens.
5.3 Markets versus central planning
As notably emphasized by Hayek (1945), the solution to an economic problem typically
depends on information that is scattered across different individuals, and historically,
two institutions for reaching solutions have dominated economic analysis. In a market, a
public summary of the scattered information is generated, and this summary shapes the
opportunities available to individuals so that their independent choices are harmonious.
In a (direct) mechanism, the scattered information is reported to a central authority, who
calculates and administers a solution. While today, it is perhaps generally recognized
that markets may be imperfect and mechanisms may help, historically (and especially
during the Cold War), the issue was often painted in black and white.12 The relative
merits of these institutions, cast as capitalism and socialism, were notably investigated
during the socialist calculation debate beginning with von Mises (1920).
An important observation from that debate is that our (standard) definitions of mar-
kets and mechanisms do not preclude a hybrid institution (Lange 1936; Lerner 1944).
Indeed, a market in Walrasian equilibrium summarizes information and shapes opportu-
nities with a list of Walrasian (clearing) prices, which exist in general settings (Walras
1896; McKenzie 1954; Arrow and Debreu 1954), but it is not specified how this sum-
mary is generated; a mechanism calculates and administers a solution (Hurwicz 1972;
Gibbard 1973), but it is not specified how this solution is administered. A Vickrey direct
mechanism (Vickrey, 1961) fits both descriptions.
We believe that our analysis contributes to this debate. On the one hand, for a large
class of industries, we find that centrally-planned production is necessarily unaffordable,
inefficient, manipulable, or coercive. On the other hand, for a special class of industries,
we find that central planning that uses market principles can in fact outperform the
market, and to do so it need not resort to coercion. In such an institution, agents are
incentivized to report their private information, then these reports are used to calculate
an efficient production plan, and finally the agents voluntarily contribute the necessary
funding in exchange for promised output. The central planner plays the role of the Wal-
rasian auctioneer by calculating the Walrasian prices, but then goes further, calculating
whether or not the agents over-contribute and returning social dividends to them when
doing so does not interfere with incentives. Remarkably, precisely such an institution is
described by Lange (1936):
It seems, therefore, convenient to regard the income of consumers as being
composed of two parts: one part being the receipts for the labor services per-
formed and the other part being a social dividend constituting the individual’s
12For example, Milton Friedman (Friedman, 1962) writes: “Fundamentally, there are only two ways of
co-ordinating the economic activities of millions. One is central direction involving the use of coercion—
the technique of the army and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of
individuals—the technique of the market place.”
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share in the income derived from the capital and the natural resources owned
by society.
This notion of a social dividend continues to play a role in models of market socialism
(Bardhan and Roemer, 1992).
While our analysis suggests that for many industries, there would be some serious
problems with such an institution, our analysis also suggests that for some very special
industries, such an institution could help improve market outcomes—precisely by treat-
ing agents as citizen-shareholders and awarding social dividends. Theoretically, in such
industries, a central computer could democratically and transparently guide production
according to the interests of voluntary participants.
Appendix 1
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: In the service setting, there is no rule satisfying no-deficit, production
efficiency, voluntarism, and strategy-proofness.
Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, (τ, ϕ) satisfies the given axioms. Define Wf
to be the set of nonempty groups with finite cost:
Wf ≡ {W ∈ 2N\{∅}|C(W ) <∞}.
By weak returns, Wf is nonempty. We consider two cases.
Case 1: For each W ∈ Wf and each i ∈ W , C({i}) <∞.
For each W ∈ Wf , define the group rate for W , Γ(W ), by:
Γ(W ) ≡ C(W )∑
W C({i})
.
By positive costs and the case’s assumption, for each W ∈ Wf , Γ(W ) is well-defined.
Thus we can define the minimal group rate γ by:
γ ≡ min
W∈Wf
Γ(W ).
By positive costs, γ > 0, and by weak returns, γ < 1.
Define the collection of groups with group rate γ, Wγ, by:
Wγ ≡ {W ∈ Wf |Γ(W ) = γ}.
By construction, Wγ is nonempty. Let W ∗ be an inclusion-minimal member of Wγ (that
is, for each W ∈ Wγ, W 6⊂ W ∗). Since γ < 1, thus |W ∗| ≥ 2. By positive costs and the
case’s assumption, for each i ∈ W ∗, C({i}) ∈ (0,∞).
We proceed by first considering two successive profiles v′, v ∈ V , then considering two
families of profiles {vi′}i∈W ∗ , {vi}i∈W ∗ . First, define v′ ∈ V by:
v′i =
{
γC({i}), i ∈ W ∗,
0, else.
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We claim ∅ and W ∗ are the surplus-maximizers at v′. Indeed:
• for ∅, σv′(∅) = 0,
• for W ∗,
σv′(W
∗) =
∑
W ∗
γC({i})− C(W ∗)
= γ
∑
W ∗
C({i})− C(W ∗)
=
C(W ∗)∑
W ∗ C({i})
∑
W ∗
C({i})− C(W ∗)
= 0,
• for each W ∈ Wγ\{W ∗}, by construction there is i′ ∈ W\W ∗, and by positive costs
and the case’s assumption C({i′}) ∈ (0,∞), so
σv′(W ) =
∑
W∩W ∗
γC({i})− C(W )
≤
∑
W\{i′}
γC({i})− C(W )
<
∑
W
γC({i})− C(W )
= γ
∑
W
C({i})− C(W )
≤ C(W )∑
W C({i})
∑
W
C({i})− C(W )
= 0,
• for each W ∈ Wf\Wγ,
σv′(W ) =
∑
W∩W ∗
γC({i})− C(W )
≤
∑
W
γC({i})− C(W )∑
W C({i})
∑
W
C({i}
= (γ − C(W )∑
W C({i})
)
∑
W
C({i})
< 0, and
• for each W ∈ 2N\Wf , σv′(W ) = −∞.
Thus there is  ∈ (0, 1) such that
(i) for each W ∈ 2N\{∅,W ∗}, σv′(W ∗)−  > σv′(W ), and
(ii) for each i ∈ W ∗, v′i −  ≥ 0.
Define v ∈ V by:
vi =
{
γC({i}) + 1, i ∈ W ∗,
0, else.
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We claim W ∗ is the unique surplus-maximizer at v. Indeed, each group’s surplus
increases by at most |W ∗| from v′ to v, and the surplus of W ∗ increases by this amount
while the surplus of ∅ does not. Thus by production efficiency, ϕ(v) = W ∗.
For each i ∈ W ∗, define vi′, vi ∈ V by:
vij
′
=
{
v′i − , j = i,
v′j, else.
vij =
{
v′i − , j = i,
vj, else.
By construction of , these are indeed profiles in V . Let i ∈ W ∗. We claim W ∗ is the
unique surplus-maximizer at vi. Indeed:
• for ∅, since |W ∗| ≥ 2 and by construction of ,
σvi(W
∗) = σvi′(W
∗) + (|W ∗| − 1)
≥ σvi′(W ∗) + 1
= (σv′(W
∗)− ) + 1
> σv′(W
∗)
= 0
= σvi(∅), and
• for W ∈ 2N\{∅,W ∗}, by construction of ,
σvi′(W
∗) = σv′(W ∗)− 
> σv′(W )
≥ σvi′(W ),
so since only members ofW ∗ have higher valuations at vi than vi′, thus σvi(W ∗) > σvi(W ).
By production efficiency, ϕ(vi) = W ∗, so by voluntarism, τi(vi) ≥ −vii > −γC({i}),
so by strategy-proofness, τi(v) ≥ τi(vi) > −γC({i}).
Since i ∈ W ∗ was arbitrary, thus for each i ∈ W ∗, τi(v) > −γC({i}). By voluntarism,
for each i ∈ N\W ∗, τi(v) ≥ 0. But then∑
τi(v) > −γ
∑
W ∗
C({i})
= −C(W ∗)
= −C(ϕ(v)),
contradicting no-deficit.
Case 2: There is W ∈ Wf and i ∈ W such that C({i}) =∞.
Define M to be the maximum finite cost:
M ≡ max
Wf
C(W ).
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For each i ∈ ∪Wf such that C({i}) =∞, define C∗({i}) ≡M + 1. For all other groups,
define C∗(W ) ≡ C(W ). It is easy to verify that C∗ satisfies weak returns and positive
costs, and thus satisfies the Case 1 assumptions.
For each axiom, let us distinguish the version involving C and the version involving C∗
by writing C-axiom and C∗-axiom; for example, C-no-deficit and C∗-no-deficit. Similarly,
we write C-surplus and C∗-surplus.
By assumption, (τ, ϕ) satisfies the C-axioms. We claim that furthermore, (τ, ϕ) sat-
isfies the C∗-axioms. Indeed, both versions of strategy-proofness and voluntarism are
equivalent, as neither axiom makes reference to the cost function. Moreover, C∗-no-
deficit cannot be violated because no group has a higher cost under C∗ than under C.
Finally, all groups have the same C-surplus and C∗-surplus except the singletons from
∪Wf , so a violation of C∗-production efficiency must involve a valuation profile v where
such a singleton {i} has the highest C∗-surplus, but is not selected. But there is W ∈ Wf
such that i ∈ W , and by construction the C∗-surplus of W is higher than the C∗-surplus
of i at any profile, contradicting that {i} has the highest C∗-surplus at v.
Altogether, (τ, ϕ) satisfies the C∗-axioms, contradicting that there is no such rule by
Case 1. 
Appendix 2
In this appendix, we prove the Bidding Lemma.
Bidding Lemma: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies production efficiency if and
only if for each v ∈ V with w ≡ |ϕ(v)|,
(i) for each i ∈ ϕ(v) and each j ∈ N\ϕ(v), vi ≥ vj,
(ii) w 6= 0 implies Bw(v) ≥ µw, and
(iii) w 6= n implies µw+1 ≥ Bw+1(v).
Proof: We establish both implications.
[⇒] Let (τ, ϕ) satisfy production efficiency, let v ∈ V , and define w ≡ |ϕ(v)|.
(i) Assume, by way of contradiction, there are i ∈ ϕ(v) and j ∈ N\ϕ(v) such that
vj > vi. Then
σv
(
(ϕ(v)\{i}) ∪ {j}) = ∑
(ϕ(v)\{i})∪{j}
vk − C
(|(ϕ(v)\{i}) ∪ {j}|)
=
∑
ϕ(v)
vk + (vj − vi)− C(|ϕ(v)|)
>
∑
ϕ(v)
vk − C(|ϕ(v)|)
= σv(ϕ(v)),
contradicting that ϕ satisfies production efficiency.
(ii) Assume, by way of contradiction, w 6= 0 and µw > Bw(v). By (i), there is i ∈ ϕ(v)
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with vi = Bw(v). But then
σv(ϕ(v)\{i}) =
∑
ϕ(v)\{i}
vk − C(|ϕ(v)\{i}|)
=
∑
ϕ(v)
vk −Bw(v)−
(
C(w)− µw
)
= σv(ϕ(v)) +
(
µw −Bw(v)
)
> σv(ϕ(v)),
contradicting that ϕ satisfies production efficiency.
(iii) Assume, by way of contradiction, w 6= n and Bw+1(v) > µw+1. By (i), there is
i ∈ N\ϕ(v) with vi = Bw+1(v). But then
σv(ϕ(v) ∪ {i}) =
∑
ϕ(v)∪{i}
vk − C(|ϕ(v) ∪ {i}|)
=
∑
ϕ(v)
vk +Bw+1(v)−
(
C(w) + µw+1
)
= σv(ϕ(v)) +
(
Bw+1(v)− µw+1
)
> σv(ϕ(v)),
contradicting that ϕ satisfies production efficiency.
[⇐] Assume, by way of contradiction, (τ, ϕ) satisfies the hypotheses but does not satisfy
production efficiency. Then there are v ∈ V and W ⊆ N such that σv(W ) > σv(ϕ(v)).
Let W ∗ ⊆ N be a group of |W | agents such that i ∈ W ∗ and vj > vi implies j ∈ W ∗.
Since C(W ∗) = C(W ), thus σv(W ∗) ≥ σv(W ) > σv(ϕ(v)).
Let σ∗(w) denote the surplus at v for serving w highest-valuation agents. Formally,
define σ∗ : {0, 1, ..., n} → R by: σ∗(0) = 0, and for each w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
σ∗(w) =
w∑
r=1
(
Br(v)− µr
)
.
By construction of W ∗ and by (i), σ∗(|W ∗|) = σv(W ∗) > σv(ϕ(v)) = σ∗(|ϕ(v)|).
For each w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, since Bw(v) is non-increasing in w and µw is non-decreasing
in w, thus Bw(v)− µw is non-increasing in w. Then σ∗ is maximized at w if σ∗(w) sums
across all positive terms and no negative terms, or if:
• w 6= 0 implies Bw(v)− µw ≥ 0 and
• w 6= n implies 0 ≥ Bw+1(v)− µw+1.
But by (i), (ii), and (iii), these conditions are met for |ϕ(v)|, so σ∗ is maximized at |ϕ(v)|,
contradicting σ∗(|W ∗|) > σ∗(|ϕ(v)|). 
Appendix 3
In this appendix, we prove the Price Lemma.
Price Lemma: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies strategy-proofness if and only
if for each i ∈ N and each v−i ∈ V−i, there are τ+i (v−i), τ−i (v−i) ∈ R and pi(v−i) ∈
R ∪ {−∞,∞} such that for each vi ∈ Vi,
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(i) (τi(v), ϕi(v)) is either (τ
+
i (v−i), 1) or (τ
−
i (v−i), 0),
(ii) pi(v−i) 6∈ {−∞,∞} implies τ+i (v−i) = τ−i (v−i)− pi(v−i),
(iii) vi > pi(v−i) implies i ∈ ϕ(v), and
(iv) pi(v−i) > vi implies i 6∈ ϕ(v).
Proof: We establish both implications.
[⇒] Let (τ, ϕ) satisfy strategy-proofness, let i ∈ N , and let v−i ∈ V−i. We begin by
defining τ+i (v−i), τ
−
i (v−i), and pi(v−i).
If there are vi, v
′
i ∈ Vi such that i ∈ ϕ(v) and i ∈ ϕ(v′i, v−i), then by strategy-proofness
τi(v) = τi(v
′
i, v−i). Thus if there is v
+
i ∈ Vi such that i ∈ ϕ(v+i , v−i), then there is a unique
τ+i (v−i) ∈ R such that for each vi ∈ Vi, i ∈ ϕ(v) implies τi(v) = τ+i (v−i). If there is no
such v+i ∈ Vi, let τ+i (v−i) ∈ R be arbitrary.
Similarly, if there is v−i ∈ Vi such that i 6∈ ϕ(v−i , v−i), then there is a unique τ−i (v−i) ∈
R such that for each vi ∈ Vi, i 6∈ ϕ(v) implies τi(v) = τ−i (v−i); if there is no such v−i ∈ Vi,
let τ−i (v−i) ∈ R be arbitrary.
If there are v+i , v
−
i ∈ Vi such that i ∈ ϕ(v+i , v−i) and i 6∈ ϕ(v−i , v−i), then define
pi(v−i) ≡ τ−i (v−i) − τ+i (v−i). If for each vi ∈ Vi, i ∈ ϕ(v), then define pi(v−i) ≡ −∞. If
for each vi ∈ Vi, i 6∈ ϕ(v), then define pi(v−i) ≡ ∞.
By construction, (i) and (ii) hold. If pi(v−i) ∈ {−∞,∞}, then it is immediate that
(iii) and (iv) hold as well, so assume pi(v−i) ∈ R. Then there are v+i , v−i ∈ Vi such
that i ∈ ϕ(v+i , v−i) and i 6∈ ϕ(v−i , v−i). Moreover, pi(v−i) = τ−i (v−i) − τ+i (v−i), so
with valuation pi(v−i) ∈ Vi, i is indifferent between (τ+i (v−i), 1) and (τ−i (v−i), 0). If
vi > pi(v−i), then (τ+i (v−i), 1) is preferred and is attainable by reporting v
+
i , so by
strategy-proofness it must be attained by reporting vi, so i ∈ ϕ(v). Similarly, pi(v−i) > vi
implies i 6∈ ϕ(v); thus (iii) and (iv) hold, as desired.
[⇐] Assume (τ, ϕ) satisfies the hypotheses. Let i ∈ N , v ∈ V , and v′i ∈ Vi. If pi(v−i) ∈
{−∞,∞}, then by (iii) and (iv) (τi(v), ϕi(v)) = (τi(v′i, v−i), ϕi(v′i, v−i)) and we are done. If
not, by (ii) pi(v−i) = τ−i (v−i)− τ+i (v−i). If ϕi(v) = ϕi(v′i, v−i), then by (i) (τi(v), ϕi(v)) =
(τi(v
′
i, v−i), ϕi(v
′
i, v−i)) and we are done, so assume either i ∈ ϕ(v)\ϕ(v′i, v−i) or i ∈
ϕ(v′i, v−i)\ϕ(v).
If i ∈ ϕ(v)\ϕ(v′i, v−i), then by (iv) vi ≥ pi(v−i), so by (i)
viϕi(v) + τi(v) ≥ pi(v−i) + τ+i (v−i)
=
(
τ−i (v−i)− τ+i (v−i)
)
+ τ+i (v−i)
= τ−i (v−i)
= viϕi(v
′
i, v−i) + τi(v
′
i, v−i),
as desired. If i ∈ ϕ(v′i, v−i)\ϕ(v), then by (iii) pi(v−i) ≥ vi, so by (i)
viϕi(v) + τi(v) = τ
−
i (v−i)
=
(
τ−i (v−i)− τ+i (v−i)
)
+ τ+i (v−i)
= pi(v−i) + τ+i (v−i)
≥ viϕi(v′i, v−i) + τi(v′i, v−i),
as desired. 
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Appendix 4
In this appendix, we prove the Auction Lemma.
Auction Lemma: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies production efficiency and
strategy-proofness if and only if it is a peer-consolation rule.
Proof: We establish both implications.
[⇒] Let (τ, ϕ) be a rule satisfying production efficiency and strategy-proofness. By the
Price Lemma, there are τ+i (v−i), τ
−
i (v−i) ∈ R and pi(v−i) ∈ R satisfying the stated
requirements.13
Let i ∈ N and let v−i ∈ V−i. Define pi ≡ pi(v−i) and define w ≡ Ω(v−i). By definition,
Bw(v−i) ≥ µw and, if w < n − 1, µw+1 > Bw+1(v−i). We claim that vi > pi implies
i ∈ ϕ(v) and pi > vi implies i 6∈ ϕ(v).
Case 1: w > 0 and vi > Bw(v−i). If w > |ϕ(v)|, then by the definition of w and by the
Bidding Lemma,
vi > Bw(v−i)
≥ µw
≥ µ|ϕ(v)|+1
≥ B|ϕ(v)|+1(v).
Thus i is in any group of |ϕ(v)| highest bidders, so by the Bidding Lemma, i ∈ ϕ(v).
If |ϕ(v)| ≥ w, then since i is in any group of w highest bidders, thus i is in any group
of |ϕ(v)| highest bidders, so by the Bidding Lemma i ∈ ϕ(v).
Case 2: vi > µw+1. If w = n − 1, then by production efficiency i ∈ ϕ(v), so assume
n− 1 > w.
• If w = 0, then vi > µ1 > B1(v−i), so by production efficiency ϕ(v) = {i}.
• If w > 0 and vi > Bw(v−i), then by Case 1, i ∈ ϕ(v).
• Assume w > 0 and Bw(v−i) ≥ vi. Then Bw(v−i) ≥ vi > µw+1 > Bw+1(v−i),
so Bw+1(v) = vi > µw+1 and µw+2 ≥ µw+1 > Bw+1(v−i) = Bw+2(v). Thus by the
Bidding Lemma, |ϕ(v)| = w + 1 and i ∈ ϕ(v).
Case 3: pi > vi. Assume, by way of contradiction, i ∈ ϕ(v).
If w = 0, then µ1 > vi, so σv(ϕ(v)\{i}) > σv(ϕ(v)), contradicting that ϕ satisfies
production efficiency.
Assume w > 0. By the Bidding Lemma, i is one of the |ϕ(v)| highest bidders, so as
Bw(v−i) > vi, thus |ϕ(v)| > w. But then |ϕ(v)| ≥ w + 1, so by the Bidding Lemma,
vi ≥ µ|ϕ(v)| ≥ µw+1, contradicting µw+1 > vi.
In each case our claim is true, so pi(v−i) = pi = pi(v−i). Define αi(v−i) ≡ τ−i (v−i) and
by the Price Lemma we are done.
13Using production efficiency, we can rule out pi(v−i) ∈ {−∞,∞}: since 0 ≤ µ1 < ∞, we can always
find v+i so that i wins and v
−
i so that i loses.
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[⇐] Assume that (τ, ϕ) satisfies the requirements and let (αi) be its list of peer-consolation
schedules. Since (τ, ϕ) is a peer-consolation rule, it satisfies production efficiency. For
each i ∈ N and each v−i ∈ V−i, define τ+i (v−i) ≡ αi(v−i)−pi(v−i), τ−i (v−i) ≡ αi(v−i), and
pi(v−i) ≡ pi(v−i). It is straightforward to verify that these satisfy the requirements of the
Price Lemma, so (τ, ϕ) is strategy-proof. 
Appendix 5
In this appendix, we prove the Winner-Loser Prices Lemma.
Winner-Loser Prices Lemma: In the object setting, for each v ∈ V and each i ∈ N ,
(i) vi ≥ pi(v−i) implies pi(v−i) = pi+(v), and
(ii) pi(v−i) ≥ vi implies pi(v−i) = pi−(v).
Moreover, either vi ≥ pi−(v) ≥ pi+(v) or pi−(v) ≥ pi+(v) ≥ vi.
Proof: Let v ∈ V and let i ∈ N . Define pii ≡ pi(v−i), define w ≡ Ω(v), and define
wi ≡ Ω(v−i). By definition, in N at least w agents bid at least µw and (if n > w) less
than w + 1 agents bid at least µw+1. Similarly, in N\{i} at least wi agents bid at least
µwi and less than wi + 1 agents bid at least µwi+1.
If w = n, then wi = n− 1 and Bn−1(v−i) ≥ µn, so pii = µn. If w = 0, then wi = 0, so
pii = µ1. Assume n > w > 0.
Case 1: µwi+1 > Bwi(v−i). Then pii = Bwi(v−i), and in N\{i} at least wi agents bid
at least pii and less than wi agents bid more than pii. Thus in N , regardless of what i
bids, at least wi agents bid at least pii, which is at least µwi , and less than wi + 1 agents
bid more than pii, which is at most µwi+1, so w = wi.
If vi ≥ pii, then vi ≥ Bw(v−i), so Bw+1(v) = Bw(v−i) = pii. Since Bw+1(v) =
Bwi(v−i) ≥ µwi = µw, altogether pii = max{Bw+1(v), µw}, as desired.
If pii ≥ vi, then Bw(v−i) ≥ vi, so Bw(v) = Bw(v−i) = pii. Since µw+1 > Bwi(v−i) =
Bw(v), altogether pii = min{Bw(v), µw+1}, as desired.
Case 2: Bwi(v−i) ≥ µwi+1. Then pii = µwi+1, and in N\{i} exactly wi agents bid at
least pi.
If vi ≥ pii, then in N exactly wi + 1 agents bid at least pii = µwi+1, so w = wi + 1
and pii = µw. Since vi ≥ pii = µwi+1 > Bwi+1(v−i), thus Bwi+1(v−i) = Bwi+2(v) =
Bw+1(v). Since µw = µwi+1 > Bwi+1(v−i) = Bw+1(v), altogether pii = max{Bw+1(v), µw},
as desired.
In the special case that vi = pii = µw, we have that vi = Bwi+1(v) = Bw(v). Since
µw+1 ≥ µw = vi = Bw(v), thus pii = min{Bw(v), µw+1}, as desired.
If pi > vi, then in N exactly wi agents bid at least pii = µwi+1, so w = wi and
pii = µw+1. Since Bwi(v−i) ≥ µwi+1 = pii > vi, thus Bwi(v−i) = Bwi(v) = Bw(v). Since
Bw(v) = Bwi(v−i) ≥ µwi+1 = µw+1, altogether pii = min{Bw(v), µw+1}, as desired.
Conclusion: If w ∈ {0, n}, then pi−(v) = pi+(v). If n > w > 0, then Bw(v) ≥
Bw+1(v), Bw(v) ≥ µw, µw+1 > Bw+1, and µw+1 ≥ µw, so altogether pi−(v) ≥ pi+(v).
Assume, by way of contradiction, pi−(v) > vi > pi+(v). Then n > w > 0 and
Bw(v) > vi > Bw+1(v), which is impossible. 
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Appendix 6
In this appendix, we prove the Consolation Lemma.
Consolation Lemma: In the object setting, if a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies production ef-
ficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy-in-trades, then (τ, ϕ) is a peer-consolation rule
with peer-consolation schedules (αi) such that for each i ∈ N and each pair v−i, v′−i ∈ V−i,
pi(v−i) = pi(v′−i) implies αi(v−i) = αi(v
′
−i).
Proof: Assume that (τ, ϕ) satisfies production efficiency, strategy-proofness and no-
envy-in-trades. By the Auction Lemma, (τ, ϕ) is a peer-consolation rule. Let (αi) be its
peer-consolation schedules. By no-envy-in-trades, for each v ∈ V , there are τ+(v), τ−(v) ∈
R such that i ∈ ϕ(v) implies τi(v) = τ+(v) and i 6∈ ϕ(v) implies τi(v) = τ−(v).
Let i ∈ N and let pi ∈ [µ1, µn]. We claim that for each pair v−i, v′−i ∈ V−i such that
pi(v−i) = pi(v′−i) = pi, αi(v−i) = αi(v
′
−i).
Case 1:14 pi ∈ [µ1, µn]\{µ1, µ2, ..., µn}. Let v−i ∈ V−i with pi(v−i) = pi, and define
w ≡ Ω(v−i). By construction, Bw(v−i) = pi, µw+1 ≥ Bw(v−i), and Bw(v−i) ≥ µw. Since
pi 6∈ {µw, µw+1}, thus pi ∈ (µw, µw+1). Define v∗ ∈ V to be the profile where each agent
reports pi.
Define vi ≡ max{B1(v−i), µn}+ 1 and define v0 ≡ (vi, v−i). For each r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n},
define vr ∈ V by:
vrk ≡
{
pi, k = Ar(v
0),
vr−1k , else.
Observe that vn = v∗. Observe also that at v0, w agents report more than pi and one
agent reports pi. We prove three claims, then conclude.
First, we claim that for each r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, τ+(vr) = τ−(vr) − pi. Indeed, let
r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Since at vr, less than w agents report more than pi but more than w
agents bid at least pi, and since pi ∈ (µw, µw+1), thus by the Bidding Lemma |ϕ(vr)| = w,
and moreover there are j, j′ ∈ N such that vrj = pi = vrj′ , j ∈ ϕ(vr), and j′ ∈ N\ϕ(vr).
By no-envy-in-trades for j and j′, pi + τ+(vr) = τ−(vr), as desired.
Second, we claim τ+(v
1) = τ+(v
0). Since vi > B1(v−i), thus i = A1(v0). Since vi > µn,
thus by production efficiency i ∈ ϕ(v0), so τ+(v0) = τi(v0). By the Auction Lemma,
either i ∈ ϕ(v1) and τi(v1) = τ+(v0) or i 6∈ ϕ(v1) and τi(v1) = τ+(v0) + pi. Thus either
τ+(v
1) = τ+(v
0) or τ−(v1) = τ+(v0)+pi. By the first claim, in either case τ+(v1) = τ+(v0),
as desired.
Third, we claim that for each r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1}, τ+(vr+1) = τ+(vr). Indeed, let
r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1} and define j ≡ Ar(vr). Since at v−j less than w agents report more
than pi but at least w agents bid at least pi, and since pi ∈ (µw, µw+1), thus pi(v−j) = pi.
We consider four exhaustive possibilities:
• j ∈ ϕ(vr+1) and j ∈ ϕ(vr). Then by strategy-proofness τ+(vr+1) = τ+(vr) as desired.
• j ∈ ϕ(vr+1) and j 6∈ ϕ(vr). Then by the Auction Lemma τ+(vr+1) = τ−(vr)− pi, so
by the first claim τ+(v
r+1) = τ+(v
r) as desired.
14This is an adaptation of a similar argument from Ohseto (2006).
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• j 6∈ ϕ(vr+1) and j ∈ ϕ(vr). Then by the Auction Lemma τ−(vr+1) = τ+(vr) + pi, so
by the first claim τ+(v
r+1) = τ+(v
r) as desired.
• j 6∈ ϕ(vr+1) and j 6∈ ϕ(vr). Then by strategy-proofness τ−(vr+1) = τ−(vr), so by the
first claim τ+(v
r+1) = τ+(v
r) as desired.
To conclude, by the first claim either i ∈ ϕ(v∗) and τi(v∗) = τ+(v∗) or i 6∈ ϕ(v∗) and
τi(v
∗) = τ+(v∗) + pi. Since at v∗−i less than w agents report more than pi but at least w
agents bid at least pi, and since pi ∈ (µw, µw+1), thus pi(v∗−i) = pi. Since vi > µn, thus
by production efficiency, i ∈ ϕ(vi, v∗−i). Altogether, by the Auction Lemma τi(vi, v∗−i) =
τ+(v
∗).
By the second and third claim, τ+(v
∗) = τ+(vn) = τ+(v0) = τ+(v). Since vi > µn,
thus by production efficiency, τi(v) = τ+(v) = τ+(v
∗) = τi(vi, v∗−i). Since i ∈ ϕ(v),
i ∈ ϕ(vi, v∗−i), and pi(v−i) = pi(v∗−i), thus by the Auction Lemma, αi(v−i) = αi(v∗−i).
Since v−i ∈ V−i with pi(v−i) = pi was arbitrary, thus for each pair v−i, v′−i ∈ V−i with
pi(v−i) = pi = pi(v′−i), αi(v−i) = αi(v
∗
−i) = αi(v
′
−i), as desired.
Case 2: pi ∈ {µ1, µ2, ..., µn}. Since several marginal costs may be equal, define
w− ≡ min{w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}|pi = µw}, and
w+ ≡ max{w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}|pi = µw}.
We wish to partition V−i based on (i) the number h of agents with reports higher than
pi, and (ii) the number e of agents with reports equal to pi. Formally, for each v−i ∈ V−i,
define
H(v−i) ≡ |{j ∈ N\{i}|vj > pi}|, and
E(v−i) ≡ |{j ∈ N\{i}|vj = pi}|.
For each pair h, e ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}, define
V−i(h, e) ≡ {v−i ∈ V−i|H(v−i) = h and E(v−i) = e}.
Note that these classes are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, though some
are empty (in particular, when h+ e > n− 1). Define the subcollection V of these classes
over which price is constantly pi by:
V ≡ {V−i(h, e)|V−i(h, e) 6= ∅ and v−i ∈ V−i(h, e) implies pi(v−i) = pi}.
We claim that pi(v−i) = pi if and only if v−i ∈ ∪VV−i(h, e).
Claim 1: For each v−i ∈ V−i, pi(v−i) > pi if and only if H(v−i) ≥ w+.
[⇒] We prove the contrapositive. Assume w+ > H(v−i). If w+ = n, then pi = µn ≥
pi(v−i) as desired, so assume n > w+ > H(v−i).
If w+ = n − 1, then w+ ≥ Ω(v−i). If n − 1 > w+, then µw++1 > µw+ ≥ Bw+(v−i) ≥
Bw++1(v−i), so w+ ≥ Ω(v−i).
If w+ > Ω(v−i), then pi = µw+ ≥ µΩ(v−i)+1 ≥ pi(v−i).
If w+ = Ω(v−i), then pi = µw+ ≥ Bw+(v−i) = BΩ(v−i)(v−i) ≥ pi(v−i).
Altogether, pi(v−i) > pi implies H(v−i) ≥ w+, as desired.
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[⇐] Assume H(v−i) ≥ w+. Then Bw+(v−i) > µw+ , so Ω(v−i) ≥ w+.
If pi(v−i) = BΩ(v−i)(v−i) and Ω(v−i) = w+, then pi(v−i) > µw+ = pi directly from above.
If pi(v−i) = BΩ(v−i)(v−i) and Ω(v−i) > w+, then pi(v−i) = BΩ(v−i)(v−i) ≥ µΩ(v−i) ≥
µw++1 > µw+ = pi.
If pi(v−i) = µΩ(v−i)+1, then pi(v−i) = µΩ(v−i)+1 ≥ µw++1 > µw+ = pi.
Altogether, pi(v−i) > µw+ = pi, as desired.
Claim 2: For each v−i ∈ V−i, pi > pi(v−i) if and only if w− − 1 > H(v−i) + E(v−i).
[⇒] We prove the contrapositive. AssumeH(v−i)+E(v−i) ≥ w−−1. ThenBw−−1(v−i) ≥
µw− > µw−−1, so Ω(v−i) ≥ w− − 1.
If pi(v−i) = BΩ(v−i)(v−i) and Ω(v−i) = w− − 1, then pi(v−i) > µw− = pi directly from
above.
If pi(v−i) = BΩ(v−i)(v−i) and Ω(v−i) > w− − 1, then pi(v−i) = BΩ(v−i)(v−i) ≥ µΩ(v−i) ≥
µw− = pi.
If pi(v−i) = µΩ(v−i)+1, then pi(v−i) = µΩ(v−i)+1 ≥ µw− = pi.
Altogether, pi > pi(v−i) implies w− − 1 > H(v−i) + E(v−i), as desired.
[⇐] Assume w− − 1 > H(v−i) + E(v−i). Then µw− > Bw−−1(v−i) ≥ Bw−(v−i), so
w− − 1 ≥ Ω(v−i).
If w− − 1 = Ω(v−i), then pi = µw− > Bw−−1(v−i) = BΩ(v−i)(v−i) ≥ pi(v−i).
If w− − 1 > Ω(v−i), then pi = µw− > µw−−1 ≥ µΩ(v−i)+1 ≥ pi(v−i).
Altogether, w− − 1 > H(v−i) + E(v−i) implies pi > pi(v−i).
Claim 3: For each h ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1} such that V−i(h, 0) ∈ V , αi is constant on
V−i(h, 0).
Let h ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1} such that V−i(h, 0) ∈ V .
Subcase 1: h = 0. Let v−i, v′−i ∈ V−i(h, 0), and define v, v′ ∈ V by v ≡
(µ1−1, v−i) and v′ ≡ (µ1−1, v′−i). Define v0 ≡ v, and for each r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, recursively
define vr ∈ V by vr ≡ (v′r, vr−1−r ). For each r ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}, at vr all agents report less
than µ1 and lose, so all agents receive the same transfer. By strategy-proofness, for each
r ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, τr(vr) = τr(vr−1). Altogether, τ1(v) = τ1(v0) = τ1(vn) = τ1(v′), so by the
Auction Lemma, αi(v−i) = αi(v′−i).
Subcase 2: h > 0. First, we claim that for each v−i ∈ V−i(h, 0), each vi ∈ Vi such
that pi > vi, and each j ∈ N such that pi > vj, pij(v−j) = pi. Indeed, let v−i ∈ V−i(h, 0),
vi ∈ Vi, and j ∈ N satisfy these requirements. Since E(v−i) = 0, thus BΩ(v−i)(v−i) 6= pi,
so BΩ(v−i)(v−i) > pi = µΩ(v−i)+1. By construction, µΩ(v−i)+1 > BΩ(v−i)+1(v−i). Thus at v,
there are Ω(v−i) agents with bids over µΩ(v−i)+1, and the others (including i and j) have
bids under µΩ(v−i)+1. It follows that pi(v−j) = µΩ(v−i)+1 = pi, as desired.
Next, we introduce a definition. For each v−i ∈ V−i(h, 0), we say that v′′−i ∈ V−i(h, 0)
is a swap of v−i if there are j, k ∈ N\{i} such that vk > pi > vj, v′′j > pi > v′′k , and
v′′i′ ≡

v′′j , i
′ = j,
v′′k , i
′ = k,
vi′ , else.
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Observe that if v′′−i is a swap of v−i, then v
′′
−i ∈ V−i(h, 0) and v−i is a swap of v′′−i.
Second, we claim that for each v−i ∈ V−i(h, 0) and each v′′−i that is a swap of v−i,
αi(v−i) = αi(v′′−i). Indeed, let v−i, v
′′
−i ∈ V−i(h, 0) and j, k ∈ N\{i} be as in the definition.
Define v′−i ∈ V−i by v′−i ≡ (v′′j , v−i,j), and define v, v′, v′′ ∈ V by v ≡ (µ1 − 1, v−i),
v′ ≡ (µ1− 1, v′−i), and v′′ ≡ (µ1− 1, v′′−i). As argued for the first claim, pi = µΩ(v−i)+1. By
the first claim, pi(v−i) = pi(v−j) = pi, so at v both i and j lose, so by no-envy-in-trades
τj(v) = τi(v). By the Auction Lemma, τj(v
′) = τj(v) − pi = τi(v) − pi. At v′, there
are Ω(v−i) + 1 agents (including j and k) with bids above pi and the others (including
i) have bids below pi. Since pi = µΩ(v−i)+1, thus pi(v
′
−j) = pi(v
′
−k) = pi, so at v
′ both j
and k win, so by no-envy-in-trades τk(v
′) = τj(v′) = τi(v) − pi. By the Auction Lemma,
τk(v
′′) = τk(v′) + pi = τi(v). By the first claim, pi(v′′−i) = pi(v
′′
−k) = pi, so at v
′′ both i and
k lose, so by no-envy-in-trades τi(v
′′) = τk(v′′) = τi(v). Thus by the Auction Lemma,
αi(v−i) = αi(v′′−i), as desired.
To conclude, let v−i, v′−i ∈ V−i(h, 0). If h ≥ 1, then with either one or two swaps from
v−i, we can arrive at v1−i for which the first rank-index agent and his bid are as in v
′
−i.
Similarly, if h ≥ 2, with either one or two swaps from v1−i, we can arrive at v2−i for which
the first two rank-index agents and their bids are as in v′−i. Proceeding in this fashion,
we can arrive at vh−i for which the first h rank-index agents and their bids are as in v
′
−i.
By our second claim, αi(v−i) = αi(vh−i). At this point we use an argument similar to that
in Subcase 1. Define vh, v′ ∈ V by vh ≡ (µ1 − 1, vh−i) and v′ ≡ (µ1 − 1, v′−i). If there is
j ∈ N\{i} with rank-index h+ 1 at v′−i, then j bids less than pi at both vh and v′, so by
the first claim, both i and j face price pi and lose at both vh and v′. By strategy-proofness
j receives the same transfer at both profiles, and by no-envy-in-trades i receives the same
transfer as j at each profile, so altogether i receives the same transfer at both profiles.
By repeating this argument, i receives the same transfer as we proceed from vh to v′ by
changing each agent’s bid to match his bid at v′ one at a time, so τi(vh) = τi(v′). By the
Auction Lemma, αi(v
h
−i) = α(v
′
−i), so altogether αi(v−i) = αi(v
′
−i), as desired.
Claim 4: For each pair h, e ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1} such that V−i(h, e), V−i(h, e + 1) ∈ V ,
if αi is constant on V−i(h, e), then αi is constant on V−i(h, e+ 1) ∪ V−i(h, e).
Assume V−i(h, e), V−i(h, e + 1) ∈ V and αi is constant on V−i(h, e). Then there is
a ∈ R such that for each v−i ∈ V−i(h, e), αi(v−i) = a.
Let v−i ∈ V−i(h, e+ 1). Since v−i ∈ V−i(h, e+ 1) ∈ V , thus pi(v−i) = pi. Define v ∈ V
by (pi, v−i). By definition of V−i(h, e + 1), there is j ∈ N\{i} such that vj = pi. Since
vi = vj, thus pi(v−j) = pi(v−i) = pi. By no-envy-in-trades, no matter whether both i and
j win, or both lose, or one wins and the other loses, αi(v−i) = αj(v−j).
For each  > 0, define v ∈ V by (pi − , v−j). Consider an arbitrary v. Since
v−i ∈ V−i(h, e), thus either i wins and receives a− pi or i loses and receives a. Moreover,
v−j = v−j. By the Auction Lemma, j loses and receives αj(v−j). If i wins, then by
no-envy-in-trades, αj(v−j) ≥ (pi− ) + (a− pi) and pi+ (a− pi) ≥ αj(v−j). If i loses, then
by no-envy-in-trades, αj(v−j) = a. Thus in both cases, αj(v−j) ∈ [a− , a].
Since  > 0 was arbitrary, thus αj(v−j) = a, so αi(v−i) = a. Since v−i ∈ V−i(h, e+ 1)
was arbitrary, thus αi is constant on V−i(h, e+ 1) ∪ V−i(h, e), as desired.
Claim 5: For each pair h, e ∈ {0, 1, ..., n−1} such that V−i(h, e), V−i(h−1, e+1) ∈ V ,
if αi is constant on V−i(h, e), then αi is constant on V−i(h− 1, e+ 1) ∪ V−i(h, e).
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Assume V−i(h, e), V−i(h− 1, e+ 1) ∈ V and αi is constant on V−i(h, e). Then there is
a ∈ R such that for each v−i ∈ V−i(h, e), αi(v−i) = a.
Let v−i ∈ V−i(h− 1, e+ 1). Since v−i ∈ V−i(h− 1, e+ 1) ∈ V , thus pi(v−i) = pi. Define
v ∈ V by (pi, v−i). By definition of V−i(h− 1, e+ 1), there is j ∈ N\{i} such that vj = pi.
Since vi = vj, thus pi(v−j) = pi(v−i) = pi. By no-envy-in-trades, no matter whether both
i and j win, or both lose, or one wins and the other loses, αi(v−i) = αj(v−j).
For each  > 0, define v ∈ V by (pi + , v−j). Consider an arbitrary v. Since
v−i ∈ V−i(h, e), thus either i wins and receives a− pi or i loses and receives a. Moreover,
v−j = v−j. By the Auction Lemma, j wins and receives αj(v−j)−pi. If i wins, then by no-
envy-in-trades, αj(v−j) = a. If i loses, then by no-envy-in-trades, (pi+)+(αj(v−j)−pi) ≥
a and a ≥ pi + (αj(v−j)− pi). Thus in both cases, αj(v−j) ∈ [a, a+ ].
Since  > 0 was arbitrary, thus αj(v−j) = a, so αi(v−i) = a. Since v−i ∈ V−i(h−1, e+1)
was arbitrary, thus αi is constant on V−i(h− 1, e+ 1) ∪ V−i(h, e), as desired.
Conclusion: The proof technique is illustrated by Figure 3. By Claim 1 and Claim 2,
for each v−i ∈ V−i, pi(v−i) = pi if and only if
v−i ∈
⋃
V
V−i(h, e).
Moreover, V is the collection of classes V−i(h, e) such that
(i) h ≤ w+ − 1,
(ii) h+ e ≥ w− − 1,
(iii) h ≥ 0,
(iv) e ≥ 0, and
(v) h+ e ≤ n− 1.
Thus V−i(w−−1, 0) ∈ V and V−i(w−−2, 0) 6∈ V . By Claim 3, αi is constant on V−i(w−−
1, 0), so by Claim 4, αi is constant on ∪{V−i(w−−1, e) ∈ V}, so by Claim 5, αi is constant
on ∪{V−i(h, e) ∈ V|w− − 1 ≥ h}.
Suppose there are h, e ∈ {0, 1, ..., n−1} such that V−i(h, e) ∈ V and h > w−−1. Then
V−i(h, 0) ∈ V . By Claim 3, αi is constant on V−i(h, 0), so by Claim 4 αi is constant on
V−i(h, 0)∪V−i(h, e). Moreover, for each m ∈ {0, 1, ..., h−(w−−1)}, V (h−m, e+m) ∈ V ,
so by Claim 5 αi is constant on V−i(h, 0)∪V−i(w−−1, h−(w−−1)). Thus by the previous
paragraph, αi is constant on V−i(w− − 1, 0) ∪ V−i(h, e).
Altogether, αi is constant on {V−i(h, e) ∈ V}. Thus for each pair v−i, v′−i ∈ V−i such
that pi(v−i) = pi(v′−i), αi(v−i) = αi(v
′
−i), as desired. 
Appendix 7
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies production efficiency, strategy-
proofness, and no-envy-in-trades if and only it is a citizen-shareholder rule.
Proof: We establish both implications.
[⇒] Let (τ, ϕ) satisfy the axioms. By the Consolation Lemma, then (τ, ϕ) is a peer-
consolation rule with peer-consolation schedules (αi) such that for each i ∈ N and each
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Figure 3: In this example, there are five agents, µ5 > µ4 = µ3 > µ2 > µ1, and
pi = µ4 = µ3. We have selected an agent i, and wish to show that αi is constant across
the peer-profiles in V−i that offer him price pi. The horizontal axis measures the number of
peers who bid higher than pi and the vertical axis measures the number of peers who bid
exactly pi. Each box in the grid V−i(h, e) is the corresponding class of peer profiles; those
crossed out are empty. By Claim 1 and Claim 2, V is the collection of white (unshaded)
boxes, and the profiles in these boxes are precisely those that offer price pi. By Claim 3, αi
is constant over each white box in the bottom row. By Claim 4, if αi is constant over one
white box with a second white box above it, then αi is constant over both. By Claim 5,
if αi is constant over one white box with a second white box directly to its upper-left,
then αi is constant over both. These observations together imply that αi is constant over
the white boxes.
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pair v−i, v′−i ∈ V−i,
pi(v−i) = pi(v′−i) implies αi(v−i) = αi(v
′
−i).
Thus there are functions βi : [µ1, µn]→ R such that for each i ∈ N and each v−i ∈ V−i,
(i) (τi(v), ϕi(v)) is either (βi(pi(v−i))− pi(v−i), 1) or (βi(pi(v−i)), 0),
(ii) vi > pi(v−i) implies i ∈ ϕ(v), and
(iii) pi(v−i) > vi implies i 6∈ ϕ(v).
Let pi ∈ [µ1, µn], and let v ∈ V be the profile where each agent reports pi. Assume, by way
of contradiction, there is i ∈ N such that pi(v−i) 6= pi. Then BΩ(v−i)(v−i) > µΩ(v−i)+1 =
pi(v−i). But if n− 1 ≥ Ω(v−i) + 1, then BΩ(v−i)+1(v−i) ≥ µΩ(v−i)+1, which is impossible by
definition of Ω(v−i). Thus Ω(v−i) = n− 1. But then Bn−1(v−i) > µn, contradicting that
each agent reports pi ∈ [µ1, µn]. Altogether, at v, each winner i receives βi(pi) − pi and
each loser j receives βj(pi). By no-envy-in-trades, for each pair i, j ∈ N , βi(pi) = βj(pi).
Since pi was arbitrary, for each pair i, j ∈ N , βi = βj.
Thus there is α0 : [µ1, µn] → R such that for each i ∈ N and each v−i ∈ V−i,
(τi(v), ϕi(v)) is either (α0(pi(v−i))− pi(v−i), 1) or (α0(pi(v−i)), 0).
Let w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1} such that µw+1 > µw and let pi, pi′ ∈ [µw, µw+1] such that
pi′ > pi. Let v be a profile where w agents report pi′ and the others report pi; note that
there are agents in both groups. Let i be an agent with vi = pi
′ and let j be an agent with
vj = pi. It can be easily verified that pi(v−i) = pi and pi(v−j) = pi′; thus i wins and receives
α0(pi)−pi and j loses and receives α0(pi′). By no-envy-in-trades, pi′+(α0(pi)−pi) ≥ α0(pi′)
and α0(pi
′) ≥ pi + (α0(pi)− pi). Thus
1 ≥ α0(pi
′)− α0(pi)
pi′ − pi , and
α0(pi
′) ≥ α0(pi).
Since pi, pi′ were arbitrary, thus α0 is Lipschitz-continuous with the desired restriction
on [µw, µw+1]. Since w was arbitrary, thus α0 is Lipschitz-continuous with the desired
restriction on [µ1, µn], so it is a social-dividend schedule. Altogether, (τ, ϕ) is a citizen-
shareholder rule.
[⇐] Suppose (τ, ϕ) is a citizen-shareholder rule, with α0 its social-dividend schedule. By
the Bidding Lemma and the Auction Lemma, (τ, ϕ) satisfies production efficiency and
strategy-proofness. Assume, by way of contradiction, (τ, ϕ) violates no-envy-in-trades.
Then there are v ∈ V and i, j ∈ N such that
viϕj(v) + τj(v) > viϕi(v) + τi(v).
This is clearly impossible if both agents win or if both agents lose.
If i wins and j loses, then by the Winner-Loser Prices Lemma, vi ≥ pi(v−j) ≥ pi(v−i) ≥
vj, so as α0 is a social-dividend schedule,
viϕi(v) + τi(v) = vi + (α0(pi(v−i))− pi(v−i))
= α0(pi(v−i)) + (vi − pi(v−i))
≥ α0(pi(v−i)) + (α0(vi)− α0(pi(v−i)))
≥ α0(pi(v−i)) + α0(pi(v−j))− α0(pi(v−i))
= α0(pi(v−j))
= viϕj(v) + τj(v),
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as desired.
If i loses and j wins, then by the Winner-Loser Prices Lemma, vj ≥ pi(v−i) ≥ pi(v−j) ≥
vi, so as α0 is a social-dividend schedule,
viϕi(v) + τi(v) = α0(pi(v−i))
≥ α0(pi(v−j)
= vi + (α0(pi(v−j)− vi)
≥ vi + (α0(pi(v−j))− pi(v−j))
= viϕj(v) + τj(v),
as desired. 
Appendix 8
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: In the object setting, a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies no-deficit, production effi-
ciency, strategy-proofness and no-envy-in-trades if and only it is a cost-constrained citizen-
shareholder rule.
Proof: We establish both implications.
[⇒] Let (τ, ϕ) satisfy the axioms. By Theorem 2, (τ, ϕ) is a citizen-shareholder rule with
social-dividend schedule α0. We verify that α0 satisfies the restrictions:
(i) For each i ∈ N , define vi ≡ −1. By the Bidding Lemma, ϕ(v) = ∅. Moreover, for
each i ∈ N , Ω(v−i) = 0, so pi(v−i) = µ1. Thus by no-deficit,
0 = −C(ϕ(v))
≥
∑
τi(v)
= nα0(µ1),
so α0(µ1) ≤ 0, as desired.
(ii) Let w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}. Define v ∈ V by:
vi ≡
{
µn + 1, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., w},
−1, else.
By the Bidding Lemma, ϕ(v) = {1, 2, ..., w}. Moreover, Ω(v) = w, pi+(v) = µw, and
pi−(v) = µw+1, so by the Winner-Loser Prices Lemma, so for each i ∈ ϕ(v), pi(v−i) = µw
and for each i ∈ N\ϕ(v), pi(v−i) = µw+1. Thus by no-deficit,
−C(w) = −C(ϕ(v))
≥
∑
τi(v)
= w(α0(µw)− µw) + (n− w)α0(µw+1),
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so (n− w)α0(µw+1) ≤
(
wµw − C(w)
)− wα0(µw), as desired.
(iii) For each i ∈ N , define vi ≡ µn + 1. By the Bidding Lemma, ϕ(v) = N . Moreover,
for each i ∈ N , Ω(v−i) = n− 1, so pi(v−i) = µn. Thus by no-deficit,
−C(n) = −C(ϕ(v))
≥
∑
τi(v)
= n(α0(µn)− µn),
so α0(µn) ≤ nµn − C(n)
n
, as desired.
[⇐] Let (τ, ϕ) be a cost-constrained citizen-shareholder rule with social-dividend schedule
α0. By Theorem 2, (τ, ϕ) satisfies production efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy-
in-trades.
Let v ∈ V . Define w ≡ |ϕ(v)|, define pi+ ≡ pi+(v), and define pi− ≡ pi−(v).
Case 1: w = 0. By the Bidding Lemma, µ1 ≥ B1(v). If Ω(v) = 0, then pi− = µ1. If
Ω(v) > 0, then µ1 ≥ B1(v) ≥ BΩ(v)(v) ≥ pi−, so pi− = µ1. Thus in both cases, pi− = µ1,
so by (i), ∑
τi(v) = nα0(µ1)
≤ 0
= −C(ϕ(v)),
as desired.
Case 2: w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n−1} and w < Ω(v). Then w+1 ≤ Ω(v), so by the Bidding Lemma
and the Winner-Loser Prices Lemma, µw+1 ≥ Bw+1(v) ≥ BΩ(v)(v) ≥ pi− ≥ pi+ ≥ µΩ(v) ≥
µw+1, so µw+1 = pi− = pi+.
If µw+1 = µw, then (α0(µw+1)−µw+1) = (α0(µw)−µw). If µw+1 > µw, then since α0 is
a social-dividend schedule,
α0(µw+1)− α0(µw)
µw+1 − µw ≤ 1, so α0(µw+1)−α0(µw) ≤ µw+1−µw, so
(α0(µw+1)−µw+1) ≤ (α0(µw)−µw). Thus in both cases, (α0(µw+1)−µw+1) ≤ (α0(µw)−
µw), so by (ii), ∑
τi(v) = w(α0(pi+)− pi+) + (n− w)α0(pi−)
= w(α0(µw+1)− µw+1) + (n− w)α0(µw+1)
≤ w(α0(µw)− µw) + (n− w)α0(µw+1)
≤ −C(w)
= −C(ϕ(v)),
as desired.
Case 3: w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1} and w = Ω(v). Then µw+1 = µΩ(v)+1 ≥ pi− and pi+ ≥
µΩ(v) = µw.
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If pi+ = µw, then (α0(pi+) − pi+) = (α0(µw) − µw). If pi+ > µw, then since α0 is
a social-dividend schedule,
α0(pi+)− α0(µw)
pi+ − µw ≤ 1, so α0(pi+) − α0(µw) ≤ pi+ − µw, so
(α0(pi+)− pi+) ≤ (α0(µw)− µw). Thus in both cases, (α0(pi+)− pi+) ≤ (α0(µw)− µw).
Since α0 is a social-dividend schedule, it is non-decreasing, so α0(pi−) ≤ α0(µw+1).
Thus by (ii), ∑
τi(v) = w(α0(pi+)− pi+) + (n− w)α0(pi−)
≤ w(α0(µw)− µw) + (n− w)α0(µw+1)
≤ −C(w)
= −C(ϕ(v)),
as desired.
Case 4: w = n. By the Bidding Lemma, Bn(v) ≥ µn, so Ω(v) = n, so pi+ = µn. Thus
by (iii), ∑
τi(v) = n(α0(µn)− µn)
≤ −C(n)
= −C(ϕ(v)),
as desired.
Thus in each case,
∑
τi(v) ≤ −C(ϕ(v)). Since v ∈ V was arbitrary, thus (τ, ϕ) satisfies
no-deficit, as desired. 
Appendix 9
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 4.
To prove this theorem, it is convenient to be able to abstract from the problem of
selecting winners altogether. Let us say that a rule is standard if it first selects as many
winners as possible subject to production efficiency, then chooses the winners according
to their rank-indices. Formally, define:
ϕ⊕(v) ≡ {Ar(v) ∈ N |Ω(v) ≥ r}.
Definition: A rule (τ, ϕ) is standard if ϕ = ϕ⊕, in which case we also say ϕ is standard.
Note that each standard rule indeed satisfies production efficiency. Next, we define
an operator that associates each rule with the standard rule that is Pareto-indifferent to
it, called its standardization:15
15The reader may wonder why we did not abstract from this problem earlier; we did not do so because
even though our axioms are preserved by standardization, establishing this fact relies crucially on The-
orem 2. To put it another way, standardness can be viewed as a strong continuity axiom for the winner
policy, and it is not at all obvious that this requirement can be imposed without loss of generality.
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Definition: For each rule (τ, ϕ), the standardization of (τ, ϕ) is the rule (τ⊕, ϕ⊕), where
τ⊕i (v) ≡

τi(v)− vi, i ∈ ϕ⊕(v)\ϕ(v),
τi(v) + vi, i ∈ ϕ(v)\ϕ(v⊕),
τi(v), else.
We now prove the theorem:
Theorem 4: In the object setting,
(I) a rule (τ, ϕ) (i) satisfies no-deficit, production efficiency, strategy-proofness, and
no-envy-in-trades, and (ii) is not Pareto-dominated by another such rule, if and only if it
is a cost-constrained citizen-shareholder rule with an unrelenting social-dividend schedule
whose marginal cost award profile belongs to F .
(II) a rule (τ, ϕ) (i) satisfies no-deficit, production efficiency, voluntarism, strategy-
proofness, and no-envy-in-trades, and (ii) is not Pareto-dominated by another such rule,
if and only if it is a cost-constrained citizen-shareholder rule with an unrelenting social-
dividend schedule whose marginal cost award profile belongs to FV .
Proof: By Theorem 3 and the definition of a cost-constrained social-dividend schedule,
a rule (τ, ϕ) satisfies the (I) axioms if and only if it is a citizen-shareholder rule with a
social-dividend schedule whose marginal cost award profile belongs to A. We claim such
a rule is voluntary if and only if its marginal cost award profile belongs to AV .
Indeed, let (τ, ϕ) satisfy the (I) axioms, let α0 be its social-dividend schedule, and let
a ∈ A be its marginal cost award profile. Since a ∈ A, thus a1 ≤ 0. If a ∈ AV , then
a0 = 0, so since α0 is non-decreasing, α0 only makes non-negative assignments. Thus at
each profile, each agent receives something at least as good as losing with a nonnegative
social-dividend award, so (τ, ϕ) is voluntary. If a 6∈ AV , then a0 < 0, so when each agent
reports valuation −1, each agent loses and receives a0 < 0, so (τ, ϕ) is not voluntary.
From here, we prove three claims, then conclude.
Claim 1: Each rule is Pareto-indifferent to its standardization.
Let i ∈ N and let v ∈ V . If (τ⊕i , ϕ⊕(v)) = (τi(v), ϕ(v)), then we are done. Other-
wise, there is ti ∈ R such that {(τ⊕i , ϕ⊕(v)), (τi(v), ϕ(v))} = {(ti, 0), (ti − vi, 1)}. With
preferences vi, i is indifferent between the two. Since i ∈ N was arbitrary, all agents
are indifferent between the two rules at v. Since v ∈ V was arbitrary, thus (τ⊕, ϕ⊕) is
Pareto-indifferent to (τ, ϕ).
Claim 2: Let (τ ∗, ϕ∗) and (τ, ϕ) be standard citizen-shareholder rules with social-
dividend schedules α∗0 and α0, respectively. If (i) α
∗
0 and α0 share marginal cost award
profile a, and (ii) α∗0 is unrelenting while α0 is not, then α
∗
0 strictly Pareto-dominates α0.
Let (τ ∗, ϕ∗), (τ, ϕ), α∗0, α0, and a satisfy the hypotheses. Then a ∈ A. Let pi ∈ [µ1, µn].
We claim that α0(pi) ≤ α∗0(pi). Indeed, if pi ∈ {µ1, µ2, ..., µn}, then α0(pi) = α∗0(pi).
Otherwise, there is w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and δ ∈ (0, µw+1 − µw) such that pi = µw + δ. If
δ < aw+1 − aw, then α0(pi) ≤ α∗0(pi); otherwise α0(pi) − α0(µw) > α∗0(pi) − aw = pi − µw,
contradicting a ∈ A. If δ ≥ aw+1−aw, then α0(pi) ≤ α∗0(pi); otherwise α0(µw+1)−α0(pi) <
aw+1 − α∗0(pi) = 0, contradicting a ∈ A. Thus in all cases, α0(pi) ≤ α∗0(pi), as desired.
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Since pi ∈ [µ1, µn] was arbitrary, thus for each pi ∈ [µ1, µn], α0(pi) ≤ α∗0(pi). Moreover,
since α is not unrelenting, α0 6= α∗0, so there is some pi ∈ [µ1, µn] such that α0(pi) < α∗0(pi).
From here, since (τ ∗, ϕ∗) and (τ, ϕ) are standard, it is straightforward to show that (τ ∗, ϕ∗)
strictly Pareto-dominates (τ, ϕ).
Claim 3: Let (τ ∗, ϕ∗) and (τ, ϕ) be standard citizen-shareholder rules with unrelenting
social-dividend schedules α∗0 and α0, respectively, and let a
∗ and a be their respective
marginal cost award profiles. Then (τ ∗, ϕ∗) strictly Pareto-dominates (τ, ϕ) if and only
if a∗ > a.
Let (τ ∗, ϕ∗), (τ, ϕ), α∗0, α0, a
∗, and a satisfy the hypotheses. Then a∗, a ∈ A.
If a∗ > a, then let pi ∈ [µ1, µn]. Then there are w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and δ ∈ [0, µw+1−µw]
such that pi = µw + δ. Since α
∗
0(µw) + δ = a
∗
w + δ ≥ aw + δ = α0(µw) + δ and α∗0(µw+1) =
a∗w+1 ≥ aw+1 = α0(µw+1), and since α∗0 and α0 are unrelenting, thus α∗0(pi) ≥ α0(pi). Since
pi ∈ [µ1, µn] was arbitrary, thus for each pi ∈ [µ1, µn], α0(pi) ≤ α∗0(pi). Moreover, since
a∗ > a, there is w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that α0(µw) < α∗0(µw). From here, since (τ ∗, ϕ∗) and
(τ, ϕ) are standard, it is straightforward to show that (τ ∗, ϕ∗) strictly Pareto-dominates
(τ, ϕ).
If it is not the case that a∗ > a, then either (i) α0 = α∗0 or (ii) there is w ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
such that α0(µw) > α
∗
0(µw). If (i), then since (τ
∗, ϕ∗) and (τ, ϕ) are standard, they are
equal, so neither strictly Pareto-dominates the other. If (ii), then since (τ ∗, ϕ∗) and (τ, ϕ)
are standard, it is straightforward to show that (τ ∗, ϕ∗) does not strictly Pareto-dominate
(τ, ϕ).
We begin by proving (I). First, suppose (τ, ϕ) is not Pareto-dominated by another
such rule. By Claim 1, its standardization (τ⊕, ϕ⊕) is not Pareto-dominated by another
such rule. By Claim 2, (τ⊕, ϕ⊕) is unrelenting. By Claim 3, (τ⊕, ϕ⊕) has marginal cost
award profile in F . Since (τ, ϕ) and its standardization share a social-dividend schedule,
altogether, (τ, ϕ) has an unrelenting social-dividend schedule whose marginal cost award
profile is in F , as desired.
Second, suppose (τ, ϕ) has an unrelenting social-dividend schedule whose marginal
cost award profile is in F . Assume, by way of contradiction, (τ ′, ϕ′) is a rule satisfying
the axioms of (I) that strictly Pareto-dominates (τ, ϕ). Let a ∈ A be the marginal cost
award profile of (τ, ϕ), let a′ ∈ A be the marginal cost award profile of (τ ′, ϕ′), let (τ⊕, ϕ⊕)
be the standardization of (τ, ϕ), let (τ ′⊕, ϕ′⊕) be the standardization of (τ ′, ϕ′), and
let (τ ∗, ϕ∗) be the standard citizen-shareholder rule with the unrelenting social-dividend
schedule whose marginal cost award profile is a′. By Claim 1, (τ ′⊕, ϕ′⊕) strictly Pareto-
dominates (τ, ϕ). By Claim 2, (τ ∗, ϕ∗) Pareto-dominates (τ ′⊕, ϕ′⊕), so (τ ∗, ϕ∗) strictly
Pareto-dominates (τ, ϕ). But then by Claim 3, a′ > a, contradicting a ∈ F .
The proof of (II) is analogous. 
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